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Drahozal and Wittrock: Is There a Flight from Arbitration?

IS THERE A FLIGHT FROM ARBITRATION?
ChristopherR. Drahozal*
Quentin R. Wittrock**

I.

INTRODUCTION

Are parties fleeing arbitration? "Ten to [twenty] years ago," one
commentator writes, "arbitration was the proverbial fair-haired kid. It
was touted as being cheaper, faster, and less confrontational than
litigation."' Today, the child seems to have grown into a troubled
teenager. Reports of dissatisfaction with arbitration-not only by
consumers and employees (and their advocates),2 but also by businesses
and their attorneys-appear with increasing frequency. One recent
article in the legal trade press asserts that "arbitration may be losing
some of its luster. Some attorneys complain that its costs and complexity
have been rising, while losing parties express dissatisfaction at the
*
**

John M. Rounds Professor of Law, University of Kansas School of Law, Lawrence, Kan.
Gray Plant Mooty, Minneapolis, Minn. We appreciate helpful comments from attendees at

the annual meeting of the Midwestem Law & Economics Association, the Quinnipiac-Yale
Workshop on Dispute Resolution, the Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, and the Searle
Research Symposium on Empirical Studies of Civil Liability; as well as discussions with and
comments from Jennifer Brown, Jack Dunham, Ted Eisenberg, Pauline Kim, Bob Matlin, Geoff
Miller, Sandy Meiklejohn, Erin O'Hara, Bo Rutledge, Steve Ware, Mark Weidemaier, Chris
Whytock, and several franchise attorneys. Thanks also to Angela Lam and Cheryl Johnson for their
help in data collection and to Pam Tull for her help in tracking down sources.
1. Rupert M. Barkoff, Is the Bloom Off the Rose of Alternative Dispute Resolution?,
FRANCHISE UPDATE (Dec. 4, 2007), available at http://www.franchise-update.com/articles/335
[hereinafter Barkoff, Bloom]; see also Rupert M. Barkoff, Arbitration: No Longer the Fair-Haired
Child, LJN's FRANCHISING & Bus. L. ALERT (May 2008), at 5 [hereinafter Barkoff, Fair-Haired
Child].
2. E.g., PUBLIC CITIZEN, THE ARBITRATION TRAP: How CREDIT CARD COMPANIES
ENSNARE CONSUMERS (2007), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/Finalwcover.pdf;
David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights
Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33; Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping
Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631 (2005); Jean R. Stemlight, Panacea or
Corporate Tool? Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U.
L.Q. 637 (1996) [hereinafter Stemlight, Panacea].
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difficulty of appealing in court what they regard as unfair verdicts." 3
Another article states more confidently that "arbitration has fallen out of
favor," while a recent article by a pair of prominent legal academics
suggests that there is a "flight from arbitration." 5
Nowhere has the apparent change of heart toward arbitration been
more visible than in franchising. 6 An article in the NationalLaw Journal
reports "increased franchisor disenchantment with arbitration," with
some attorneys suggesting that "the tide is turning against the alternative
forum., 7 Rupert Barkoff, a franchising lawyer, reports that "the
franchise bar is starting to throw stones at arbitration. ' 8 He finds a
3. Beth Bar, Some Attorneys Questioning Advantages of Arbitration, N.Y. L.J., May 17,
2007, at 5. But see id. ("[B]usinesses that have generally found arbitration to be useful have not
changed their views on it.").
4. Lou Whiteman, Arbitration's Fall from Grace, IN-HOUSE COUNSEL, July 13, 2006,
http://law.com/jsp/ihc/PubArticlelHC.jsp?id=- 152695125655.
5. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight from Arbitration: An Empirical
Study of Ex Ante Arbitration Clauses in the Contracts ofPublicly Held Companies, 56 DEPAUL L.
REv. 335, 335 (2006).
6. Franchising is defined as follows:
Franchising is a form of business organization that economizes on monitoring costs in an
enterprise with geographically dispersed outlets. The franchisor permits the franchisee to
use its trademark and business model and provides training and guidance in running the
business. In exchange, the franchisee pays the franchisor ongoing royalties and is
responsible for various upfront costs.
Christopher R. Drahozal & Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Litigation and Arbitration: An
Application to Franchise Contracts, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 549, 555-56 (2003). Prominent examples of
franchises include 7-Eleven Inc. (convenience stores), Subway (sandwich shops), McDonald's (fastfood restaurants), the UPS Store (shipping and office services), and Jiffy Lube International, Inc.
(oil
change
services).
See
Entreprenuer.com,
2008
Franchise
500
Rankings,
http://www.entrepreneur.com/franchises/rankings/franchise500-l15608/2008,-I.html
(last visited
Feb. 2, 2009).
7. Lynne Marek, As Franchises Take Off, So Do Lawsuits, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 13, 2007, at 8;
see also Richard Gibson, On Franchising. Pressure Grows to Rethink the Use of Mandatory
Arbitration Clauses, WALL ST. J., June 3, 2008, at B7 ("But these days there is growing pressurefrom franchisees, judges, Congress and even some franchisors-to rethink that longstanding
arrangement [of using pre-dispute arbitration clauses in franchise agreements].").
8. Marek, supra note 7 (quoting Rupert Barkoff); see also Hilary Buttrick et al., Hot Topics
in Mediation and ADR 17 (May 7-9, 2006) (unpublished paper, prepared for the International
Franchise Association's 39th Annual Legal Symposium, on file with the Hofstra Law Review)
("[M]any commentators are reconsidering these notions and carefully evaluating whether arbitration
truly is a better alternative to litigation."). For reports from other industries, see Steve A. Arbittier,
Conditional Arbitration: A New Approach to Construction Arbitration, DISP. RESOL. J., May-July
2006, at 40 ("[T]he pendulum is swinging in the other direction. Arbitration has taken on many of
the characteristics of 'scorched earth' litigation, with abusive discovery and never-ending motion
practice. The increased dissatisfaction with arbitration has led the American Institute of Architects
(AIA) to eliminate arbitration as the default dispute resolution process in its standard form
agreements. Now drafters will have a menu of options from which to choose."); and Julie Kay,
Employers Start to Push Waivers, NAT'L L.J., June 9, 2008 ("[lI]n the past couple of years,
employment defense lawyers say some of their clients have grown disenchanted with arbitration and

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol37/iss1/3

2

Drahozal and Wittrock: Is There a Flight from Arbitration?
2008]

IS THERE A FLIGHTFROM ARBITRA TION?

"growing skepticism toward arbitration .... Perhaps privacy is achieved,

but speed, cost reduction, and finality have more and more often come
into question." 9 As a consequence of this dissatisfaction, "[a]necdotal
evidence suggests that franchisors are either abandoning arbitration
altogether or using more 'carve-out' provisions (exempting specific
categories of disputes from the franchise agreement arbitration
clause)." 10
These reports-of dissatisfaction with the arbitration process
leading to a "flight from arbitration"-are not based on any systematic
study of changes in the use of arbitration clauses over time. Instead, the
evidence of flight consists largely of anecdotes, together with a study
showing a low usage of arbitration clauses in certain types of contracts. 1
But anecdotes should not be confused with empiricism, and static
examinations of the use of arbitration clauses do not show "flight"-that
is, that parties
who previously agreed to arbitration are now switching to
12
litigation.

Whether parties are fleeing arbitration for litigation is important for
a variety of reasons. Changes in party preferences for litigation versus
arbitration provide insight into how parties perceive the comparative
benefits (and costs) of those means of dispute resolution, and in
now prefer either bench trials before a judge or mediation."); and Michael Mcllwrath & Roland
Schroeder, The View from an InternationalArbitration Customer: In Dire Need of Early Resolution,
74 ARB. 3, 10 (2008) ("We know from our interactions with in-house counsel at other companies
that many have developed, or are developing, a real reluctance to resolve disputes through
international arbitration where it can be avoided.").
9. Barkoff, Fair-HairedChild, supra note 1,at 5; see also Barkoff, Bloom, supra note 1
("[T]he jury is still out, but I think the tide has turned - or at least become skeptical - about the
liturgy of benefits deriving from arbitration.").
10. Edward Wood Dunham & Michael J. Lockerby, Shall We Arbitrate? The Pros and Cons
of Arbitrating Franchise Disputes 3 (Oct. 19-21, 2005) (unpublished paper, prepared for the ABA
28th Annual Forum on Franchising, on file with the Hofstra Law Review).
11. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 5, at 350 ("Whatever arbitration's supposed efficiencies,
sophisticated actors are not flocking to it in a broad range of important contracts.").
12. In previous work, Eisenberg & Miller used the word "flight" to refer to parties who
agreed to the law of a state other than their state of incorporation to govern their contract. See
Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, Ex Ante Choices of Law and Forum: An EmpiricalAnalysis
of CorporateMerger Agreements, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1975, 2007 (2006) ("[W]e define a choice of
forum 'flight' variable analogous to the choice of law flight variable. 'Choice of forum other than
state of incorporation,' (the choice of forum flight variable) equals one when the acquiring firm's
state of incorporation and choice of litigation forum do not match. It equals zero when they do
match."). Given that the default rule for dispute resolution is litigation, the mere fact that parties do
not contract out of the default rule (by agreeing to arbitrate) cannot fairly be called a "flight" from
arbitration. Instead, in our view, "flight" requires the parties to switch from arbitration to another
form of dispute resolution. The switch can occur either when contracts are up for renewal or for
wholly new contracts. But, at a minimum, "flight" requires some change in the use of arbitration
clauses over time.
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particular whether that perception has changed in recent years. Changes
in the terms of arbitration clauses as an alternative to flight provide
information on how parties trade off the cost of the arbitration process
against concerns about limited review of awards. They also offer a look
at how businesses that operate on a nationwide basis respond to court
decisions in states in which they do business-court decisions that seem
to reflect an increasing willingness to invalidate arbitration clauses (or at
least various provisions in arbitration clauses).
This Article seeks to fill this gap in the literature. It examines
systematically whether the use of arbitration clauses has changed over
time-in other words, whether there has in fact been a flight from
arbitration. It compares the use of arbitration clauses in franchise
agreements from identical franchisors in 1999 and 2007 to see how, if at
all, the clauses have changed.1 3 Given the disenchantment with
arbitration reportedly expressed by franchisors (who draft the standard
form franchise agreements entered into by franchisees1 4), and the
importance of franchised businesses in the United States economy,15
franchising 16 is an apt setting in which to test for a flight from
arbitration.
In this Article, we consider three related questions: (1) Have
franchisors fled arbitration-that is, have franchisors replaced arbitration
clauses in franchise agreements with other dispute resolution clauses?
(2) Have franchisees fled arbitration, resulting in an increased market
share for franchisors that do not include arbitration clauses in their
franchise agreements relative to those that do? (3) As an alternative to
13. The results from 1999 were published in Christopher R. Drahozal, "Unfair" Arbitration
Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 695.
14. Indeed, the proposed Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007 groups franchisees together with
consumers and employees as parties needing protection from arbitration, and would make predispute arbitration clauses unenforceable in franchise (as well as consumer and employment)
contracts. See H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. § 4(4) (2007); S. 1782, 110th Cong. § 4(4) (2007).
15. According to a study prepared for the International Franchise Association, franchised
businesses in 2005 provided over eleven million jobs (or 8.1% of the United States private sector
workforce) and were responsible (directly or indirectly) for $2.3 trillion in United States economic
output. 2 NAT'L ECON. CONSULTING, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF FRANCHISED BUSINESSES 6-7

(2008).
16. Given that the reasons parties choose arbitration or litigation vary across industries and
across contract types, it is difficult to draw general conclusions about a flight from arbitration based
on a sample of franchise agreements. That said, our findings are consistent with the findings in a
recent study on the use of arbitration clauses in executive employment contracts. See Randall
Thomas et al., When Do CEOs Bargainfor Arbitration?:A Theoretical and EmpiricalAnalysis 21
(Vanderbilt Law & Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 08-23, 2008), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract- 1247843 (finding "an upward trend in the use of arbitration over time from
a low of 35.9% of contracts in 1997 to 60.4% of contracts in 2005").
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flight, have franchisors modified their arbitration clauses in ways that
respond to the reported reasons for dissatisfaction with arbitration?
We find that, in the aggregate, there has been little change in the
use of arbitration clauses in the franchise agreements studied. The
proportion of franchise agreements with arbitration clauses is essentially
the same in 2007 (43.7%) as it was in 1999 (45.1%). 17 Viewed
individually, there has been some reshuffling among franchisors as to
their chosen means of dispute resolution. Four franchisors (out of thirtytwo, or 12.5%) replaced arbitration clauses in their franchise agreements
with exclusive forum selection clauses, which was largely offset by three
franchisors adding arbitration clauses to their franchise agreements
(which previously had contained no dispute resolution clause at all). 18
This reshuffling of franchisors may provide at least a partial explanation
for the anecdotal reports of flight. Because we do not have data on
precisely when the franchisors switched the provisions in their franchise
agreements, it is possible that the switches away from arbitration are
more recent than the switches to arbitration, which might reflect a flight
from arbitration. Of course, the converse could be true as well-that the
switches to arbitration are more recent than the switches away from
arbitration.
We also find little indication that franchisees are fleeing arbitration
by avoiding franchisors that include arbitration clauses in their
arbitration agreements. The number of franchised locations for
franchisors in the sample that use arbitration clauses increased from
57,401 in 2000 to 76,166 in 2006.' 9 The share of those franchised
locations as a percentage of the total likewise increased, from 43.3% in
2000 to 46.0% in 2006.20 These numbers provide no evidence that
franchisees avoid franchisors that use arbitration.
Finally, most changes to the terms of arbitration clauses studied
were relatively minor, although some are worth noting. The use of class
arbitration waivers increased substantially (from approximately 50% to
almost 80% of the clauses). 21 Notably, three (of twenty-eight, or 10.7%)
of those class arbitration waivers included "non-severability" provisions
under which, 22 if a court holds the class arbitration waiver invalid, the
entire arbitration clause is invalidated. Given that a number of
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

See
See
See
See
See
See

infratbl.4.
infratbl.5.
infra tbl.6.
infra bl.6.
infratbl.11.
infra tbl. 1.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2008

5

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 3
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:71

jurisdictions have held class arbitration waivers to be unconscionable or
otherwise unenforceable, 23 these non-severability provisions result in
what might be characterized as a partial but small flight from arbitration.
The use of common carve-outs (that is, exceptions to arbitration) also
increased slightly, again indicating a partial flight from arbitration, albeit
only for those types of disputes or remedies excluded from the
obligation to arbitrate.24
Meanwhile, few provisions seem to have been modified in response
to the risk of court invalidation on unconscionability grounds (the nonseverability provision being a leading exception). Instead, other common
changes made to arbitration clauses appear to be ones designed to hold
down the cost of the process, such as providing for a sole arbitrator
instead of a panel of three arbitrators. Indeed, when franchisors faced a
choice between provisions that would reduce cost and provisions that
would reduce the risk of aberrational awards, the changes franchisors
made were consistently those that would reduce cost.
Part II of the paper examines why parties agree to arbitrate. Part III
discusses possible reasons why parties might flee arbitration. Part IV
presents our empirical results, examining changes both in the use of
arbitration clauses and in the terms of those clauses over time.
II.

WHY ARBITRATE?

The default rule governing the resolution of disputes is litigation. If
the contract is silent on how disputes are to be resolved, the parties may
go to court. 25 As the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated, parties can
only be compelled to arbitrate if they have agreed to do so 2 6-that is, if
they have contracted around the default rule by entering into an
arbitration agreement.
There is no single reason why parties include pre-dispute arbitration
clauses in their contracts. The reasons vary depending on the type of

23. See infra note 69.
24. See infra tbl.16.
25. Matthew T. Bodie, Questions About the Efficiency of Employment Arbitration
Agreements, 39 GA. L. REV. 1, 9 (2004) ("In our system of dispute resolution, litigation is the
'default rule'-the result that will take place unless the parties agree to a different alternative."); see
also Stephen J. Ware, Employment Arbitration and Voluntary Consent, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 83,

135 n.270 (1996) (referring to "the default rule that disputes are resolved by litigation, not
arbitration").
26. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995); AT&T Tech., Inc. v.
Commc'n Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648-49 (1986).
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contract involved and the sorts of claims that may arise.27 Arbitration
may make sense for one type of contract but not for another, and for one
type of claim but not for another. Thus, it should not be surprising that
the use of arbitration varies across industries and across firms, as well as
within firms and even within contracts.28
Among the reasons parties may agree to arbitration (or may include
30
29
arbitration clauses in their standard form contracts) are the following:
(1) arbitration may resolve disputes more quickly and at lower cost than
litigation;31 (2) arbitration may reduce the risk of aberrational jury

verdicts or punitive damages awards; 32 (3) arbitration may reduce a

27. E.g., Dunham & Lockerby, supra note 10, at 38 ("[T]he answer to the question 'shall we
arbitrate franchise disputes?' is not self-evident. Even after undertaking the comparative analysis
suggested in this paper, prudent franchisors, franchisees and franchise lawyers will still reach
different conclusions about the wisdom of arbitrating.").
28. Studies of the use of arbitration clauses can be grouped into at least four categories: (1)
inter-industry studies, which compare the use of arbitration clauses across industries, see, e.g., Linda
J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, "Volunteering" to Arbitrate Through Predispute Arbitration
Clauses: The Average Consumer's Experience, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 62-64 (2004);
Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 5, at 343; (2) inter-firm studies, which compare the use of clauses
across firms within the same industry, see, e.g., Drahozal & Hylton, supra note 6, at 558-60
(franchising industry); (3) intra-firm studies, which compare the use of arbitration clauses within a
single firm, see, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg et al., Arbitration'sSummer Soldiers: An EmpiricalStudy
of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871,
878 (2008); and (4) intra-contract studies, which examine exceptions to arbitration within a single
arbitration clause, see, e.g., Drahozal, supra note 13, at 739-40.
29. Note that our focus here is on why parties agree to arbitrate (that is, the positive aspect of
the decision) rather than on the extent to which these reasons benefit consumers, employees, or
franchisees (that is, the normative aspect of the decision).
30. The discussion that follows focuses principally on domestic arbitration in the United
States. For empirical evidence on the reasons parties include arbitration clauses in their international
contracts, see CHRISTIAN BOHRING-UHLE ET AL., ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION IN
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 105-128 (2d ed. 2006).
31. Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Forum Accessibility: EmpiricalEvidence,
41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 813, 826, 840 (2008).
32. Christopher R. Drahozal, A BehavioralAnalysisof PrivateJudging, 67 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 105, 131 (2004); Drahozal & Hylton, supra note 6, at 574. These concerns are illustrated by
provisions in the Baskin-Robbins and Dunkin' Donuts franchise agreements that permit the
franchisee to opt out of arbitration so long as it agrees to waive the right to jury trial and any claim
for punitive damages. The provision reads as follows:
11.6 FRANCHISEE's Exceptions. FRANCHISEE shall have the option to litigate any
cause of action otherwise eligible for arbitration hereunder and shall exercise said option
solely by filing a complaint in any court of competent jurisdiction in which
FRANCHISEE expressly waives the right to a trial by jury and any and all claim(s) for
punitive, multiple and/or exemplary damages. If any such complaint fails to include such
express waivers or if any such court of competent jurisdiction determines that all or any
part of such waivers shall be ineffective or void for any reason whatsoever, then the
parties agree that the action shall thereupon be dismissed without prejudice, leaving the
parties to their arbitration remedies, if then available pursuant to this Section 11.
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company's exposure to class actions or other forms of aggregate
litigation; 33 (4) arbitration may result in better outcomes because the
decisionmakers are experts whose incentives differ from those of
judges; 34 (5) arbitration may reduce the risk of disclosure of confidential
information; 35 (6) arbitration may facilitate the use of privately
developed trade rules; 36 (7) arbitration may
better preserve the parties'
38
relationship; 37 and other reasons as well.
Conversely, the arbitration literature has identified at least two
circumstances in which arbitration does not work well. 39 First,
arbitration does not work well in cases requiring urgent action. Before
the arbitrators can rule on a request for emergency relief, they must be
appointed by the parties, which necessarily delays any ruling.
Arbitration providers, such as the American Arbitration Association
("AAA"), have responded to this difficulty by establishing readily

Baskin-Robbins Franchising LLC, Franchise Agreement 11.6, at 17 (2007) (on file with the
Hofstra Law Review). The provision in the Dunkin' Donuts franchise agreement is essentially
identical to the one in the Baskin Robbins Franchise Agreement. See Dunkin Donuts Inc., Franchise
Agreement 11.6, at 17 (2007) (on file with the Hofstra Law Review). Dunkin' Donuts and BaskinRobbins are divisions of Dunkin' Brands, Inc., a private company. See Dunkin' Brands Corporate
Press Kit, http://www.dunkinbrands.com/pressroom/DBIPressKit.pdf (last visited Jan. 9, 2009).
33. Eisenberg et al., supra note 28, at 888; Dunham & Lockerby, supra note 10, at 30 ("For
franchisors, one of arbitration's greatest potential advantages over litigation is the ability to avoid
class and consolidated actions in distant, hostile forums, by requiring individual franchisees to
prosecute their individual claims in separate arbitrations, at a location designated in the franchise
agreement.").
34. Drahozal & Hylton, supra note 6, at 558-60.
35. Amy J. Schmitz, Untangling the Privacy Paradox in Arbitration, 54 U. KAN. L. REV.
1211, 1222-26 (2006).
36. Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for
Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1782-87 (1996).
37. See DAVID B. LIPSKY & RONALD L. SEEBER, THE APPROPRIATE RESOLUTION OF
CORPORATE DISPUTES: A REPORT ON THE GROWING USE OF ADR BY U.S. CORPORATIONS 17

(1998), availableat http://digitalcommons.ilr.comell.edu/icrpubs/4.
38. See, e.g., id. at 17, 26 (reporting survey results).
39. These two circumstances, of course, are not the only reasons parties might choose
litigation rather than arbitration. Another is when parties perceive the legal framework to be clear
and the availability of a remedy relatively certain in court, as in the case of commercial loans. Keith
N. Hylton, Agreements to Waive or to Arbitrate Legal Claims. An Economic Analysis, 8 SUP. CT.
ECON. REV. 209, 231 (2000) ("Most loan contracts are relatively clear, and courts have a great deal
of experience with them. An arbitration regime would risk diluting this predictability .... ");
William W. Park, Arbitration in Banking and Finance, 17 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 213, 215-16
(1998) ("[B]ankers have traditionally preferred judges over arbitrators.... [because a] debtor's
default usually results from simple inability or unwillingness to pay, rather than any honest
divergence in the interpretation of complex or ambiguous contract terms.").

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol37/iss1/3

8

Drahozal and Wittrock: Is There a Flight from Arbitration?
2008]

IS THERE A FLIGHT FROMARBITRATION?

available panels to rule on emergency requests, 40 but that option appears
to be used only rarely. 41 Thus, when parties anticipate that they may

need to seek emergency relief in the event of a dispute, one would
expect them to exclude such requests from arbitration or perhaps avoid
arbitration altogether.42
Second, parties may avoid arbitration of what might be called "bet-

the-company" cases-high stakes cases in which an erroneous outcome
could jeopardize the continued existence of the company.43 At least

some parties may perceive arbitration as too risky for such cases because
of the limited court review of arbitration awards.44 In more routine cases,
"knucklehead awards ' '45 or "'roll-the-dice' or 'Russian roulette'

40. E.g., American Arbitration Association, Optional Rules for Emergency Measures of
Protection, Rules 0-1 to 0-8 (amended and effective Sept. 1, 2007), available at
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22440 (last visited Jan. 20, 2009).
41. Buttrick, supra note 8, at 19 ("Despite the availability of these injunctive procedures in
arbitration, many parties still prefer the relative reliability and predictability of the courts when it
comes to obtaining a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction."); Christopher R.
Drahozal, Party Autonomy and Interim Measures in International Commercial Arbitration, in
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: IMPORTANT CONTEMPORARY QUESTIONS 179, 183
(Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 2003) ("The Rules apply, however, only when agreed to by the parties
'by special agreement or in their arbitration clause,' and such agreements were rare in the sample
[of franchise agreements]." (quoting American Arbitration Association, Optional Rules for
Emergency Measures of Protection, Rule 0-1)); Dunham & Lockerby, supra note 10, at 15 ("In
practice, however, these new procedures may suffer from significant drawbacks compared to
litigation.").
42. Relatedly, parties may be less likely to use arbitration when the typical relief sought is
equitable relief-such as injunctions-because there is no right to a jury trial in such cases.
43. Alternatively, parties may provide for expanded court review of arbitration awards
because of such concerns. See, e.g., Alan Scott Rau, ContractingOut of the Arbitration Act, 8 AM.
REV. INT'L ARB. 225, 245 (1997) (attributing the use of expanded review provisions to "a desire to
ensure predictability in the application of legal standards, a desire to guard against a 'rogue
tribunal,' or against the distortions ofjudgment that can often result from the dynamics of tripartite
arbitration"). In Hall Street Associates v. Mattel, Inc., the Supreme Court held that parties cannot by
contract expand the grounds for review under the FAA, but did not foreclose the possibility that
parties may be able to utilize other means of obtaining expanded review. 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1405-08
(2008).
44.

ALAN SCOTT RAU ET AL., PROCESSES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS

603 (4th ed. 2006) ("a party for whom the stakes and risk of loss are high may for that reason
become less interested in 'informality'-and more reluctant to chance a decision without having
taken every possible advantage of the full panoply of procedures, including the ability to play out
his hand to the bitter end"); Stephen A. Hochman, JudicialReview to Correct Error-An Option to
Consider, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 103, 104 (1997) ("[B]ecause of the uncertainties inherent
in AAA arbitration and the lack of an effective means of judicial review to correct arbitral error,
there are many who avoid using AAA pre-dispute arbitration clauses in their agreements .... ").
45. Carroll E. Neesemann, Contractingfor JudicialReview: Party-ChosenArbitral Review
Standards Can Inspire Confidence in the Process,and Is Goodfor Arbitration,DISP. RESOL. MAG.,
Fall 1998, at 18.
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arbitration" awards 46 would be just another cost of the dispute resolution
process. But in high stakes cases, an aberrational award could have a
devastating effect on the company, and may lead parties to avoid
arbitration altogether for contracts that may give rise to such disputes.
These limitations of the arbitration process are consistent with
evidence from franchise agreements.4 7 The most common exception
(carve-out) from arbitration in franchise agreements is for trademark
disputes.48 The franchisor's trademark "is the lifeblood of the business.
Given the lack of appeal in most arbitrations, the risk that an arbitrator
might wrongly determine the mark to be generic or invalid is too high. ' A9
The next most common exception is for actions seeking provisional
remedies 5" (also a common remedy in trademark disputes) for which
arbitration is not well suited."1
III.

WHY FLEE ARBITRATION?

Given these reasons for agreeing to arbitrate, this Part considers
why parties might flee arbitration. As we use the term here, parties
"flee" arbitration when they switch away from arbitration as the chosen
means of dispute resolution. Thus, parties flee arbitration, not merely
when they decide not to include an arbitration clause in their contract in
the first place, but rather when they switch from using an arbitration
clause to using a forum selection clause (or no dispute resolution clause
46. Hochman, supra note 44, at 104.
47. They also provide at least a partial explanation for the finding by Eisenberg & Miller that
businesses ordinarily do not include arbitration clauses in various contracts disclosed in SEC filings.
See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 12, at 1981. "Material" contracts (the standard for disclosure)
are more likely to involve high stakes (that is, give rise to "bet-the-company" cases) for which
parties are less likely to agree to arbitration. In addition, some of the contracts are ones for which
parties likely will seek emergency or injunctive relief in the event of a dispute. See id. at 1982
("[D]isputes in merger contracts often will be resolved through equitable relief (for example, a
motion for a preliminary injunction) .... "). Of course, the SEC's apparent opposition to the use of
arbitration in corporate by-laws, as well as the speed and certainty of the legal remedy in the event
of a defaulted loan, may well provide partial explanations as well. See Park, supra note 39, at 22223; Kara Scannell, SEC Explores Opening Door to Arbitration,WALL ST. J., Apr. 16, 2007, at Al.
48. Drahozal, supranote 13, at 739; see also infra text accompanying note 197,
49. Eileen Davis, ADR Well-Suited to Handle FranchiseCases, 10 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH
COST LITIG., Sept. 1992, at 130, 130.
50. Drahozal, supranote 13, at 739; see also infra text accompanying note 198.
51. Buttrick, supra note 8, at 18 ("Because a franchisor's ability to protect its trademark,
copyrighted materials, and trade secrets is of paramount importance, it is essential that the
franchisor have the ability to quickly obtain injunctive relief to protect its intellectual property....
Accordingly, many arbitration clauses include carve-outs to permit the parties to seek injunctive
relief from a court." (footnote omitted)); Davis, supra note 49, at 131; Dunham & Lockerby, supra
note 10, at 14 ("Preliminary injunctions are often the most effective (and sometimes the only) way
to protect intellectual property from infringement and misappropriation.").
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at all) for a particular type of contract. Accordingly, understanding
why parties might flee arbitration requires identifying some change in
circumstances that might lead the parties to change the chosen method of
dispute resolution.
A.

Flight by DraftingParties

The party that drafts a standard form contract is the obvious party to
examine for a flight from arbitration. It drafts the form, and thus controls
whether to include an arbitration clause. Possible reasons the drafting
party might flee arbitration are: (1) the party might have had some
experience with arbitration that changes its view of the costs and
benefits; (2) the legal environment (governing arbitration or otherwise)
might have changed; and (3) the business conditions facing the parties
might have changed.
1. Growing Experience with Arbitration
A drafting party decides whether to include an arbitration clause in
its standard form contract based on the information available to it at the
time. Once it starts using arbitration, it gains new information about the
process. This new information may lead the party to readjust its views of
the costs and benefits of arbitration, and may result in the party "fleeing"
arbitration.
That drafting parties would reevaluate their chosen means of
dispute resolution after gaining new information is not surprising.
Anecdotal reports suggest that such a reevaluation is in fact taking place.
According to one account: "A decade ago, many [general counsels]
turned to arbitration in hopes of slicing their companies' soaring
litigation expenses; now they're taking a second look at that decision
53
and finding that arbitration isn't the cure-all they'd once envisioned.,
If, for example, a party has had a negative experience (or series of
negative experiences) with arbitration, it presumably would be more
likely to replace the arbitration clause in its standard form contracts with
some other form of dispute resolution clause-that is, to flee arbitration.
The negative experience might be with the arbitration proceeding itself
(such as having the arbitration turn out to be more costly than expected,

52. See supra note 12.
53. Whiteman, supra note 4 ("Arbitration programs often were put together without a clear
understanding of issues such as how the program should be designed, how an arbitrator would be
selected and whether discovery would be allowed.").
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or receiving an award the party believes to be unjustified).54 Or the
negative experience might involve having to go to court to enforce the
arbitration agreement in the first place. 55 In either case, the party's
experience with arbitration may induce it to flee arbitration. Of course, if
the party's experience with arbitration is positive, 5 it6 would have no
reason to switch to another form of dispute resolution.
2. Changing Legal Environment
A drafting party also might flee arbitration due to changes in the
legal environment, either with respect to arbitration or otherwise. If
courts become less willing to enforce pre-dispute arbitration clauses (or
provisions in pre-dispute arbitration clauses), the drafting party will face
a variety of additional costs: the number of challenges to clauses may
increase, along with the costs of defending against those challenges; the
clause itself might be declared unenforceable, with the result that the
dispute will end up in court; or the arbitration process itself might
change, such as by becoming more formal and "legalized,"
which might
57
reduce the benefits of arbitration to the drafting party.
Although there continues to be an "emphatic federal policy in favor
of arbitral dispute resolution,' 5 8 some courts in recent years have
become more willing to invalidate arbitration clauses (or provisions in
arbitration clauses).59 Under section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act
("FAA"), both pre-dispute and post-dispute arbitration agreements are
"valid, irrevocable and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract., 60 This general rule

54. Id. ("The most frequent complaints involve not just money, but enforceability issues.
Arbitration offers virtually no appellate rights, no discovery rights and no provision for summary
judgment.").
55. Id.("Our company ended up investing more than a year's worth of time and substantial
legal fees simply to enforce in court our right not to have to go to court." (quoting Jonathan B.
Wilson, General Counsel, Interland, Inc.)).
56. And if the party has a negative experience with litigation, it presumably is more likely to
"flee" litigation for arbitration.
57. Gerald F. Phillips, Is Creeping Legalism Infecting Arbitration?, DISP. RESOL. J., Feb.Apr. 2003, at 37, 38.
58. E.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 631
(1985).
59. See Steven J. Burton, The New Judicial Hostility to Arbitration: Federal Preemption,
Contract Unconscionability, and Agreements to Arbitrate, 2006 J. DiSP. RESOL. 469, 485-500;
Susan Randall, JudicialAttitudes Toward Arbitration and the Resurgence of Unconscionability, 52
BUFF. L. REv. 185, 194-221 (2004); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Arbitration, Unconscionability, and
Equilibrium: The Return of Unconscionability Analysis as a Counterweight to Arbitration
Formalism, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 757, 799-807 (2004).
60. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
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of enforceability applies in state court as well as federal court, 6 1 and
preempts (at a minimum) state laws that invalidate arbitration
agreements.62 Under the savings clause of section 2, however, courts
remain able to invalidate arbitration agreements using general contract
law defenses.63
Perhaps the most popular ground for challenging the enforceability
of arbitration agreements is the doctrine of unconscionability. 64 Parties
cannot challenge a contract as unconscionable solely because it provides
for arbitration.6 5 Instead, parties challenge not the obligation to arbitrate
itself, but rather other provisions in the arbitration clause as
unconscionable.
Courts have held a wide variety of provisions in arbitration clauses
to be unconscionable or otherwise unenforceable.66 The list includes
clauses governing:
67

"

*

"

Discovery limits;
68
Arbitrator selection mechanisms;
69
Class arbitration waivers;

61. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1984).
62. Christopher R. Drahozal, FederalArbitration Act Preemption, 79 IND. L.J. 393, 408-11
(2004).
63. See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995) (holding that
courts should "apply ordinary state-law principles that govern the formation of contracts").
64. See Charles L. Knapp, Opting Out or Copping Out? An Argument for Strict Scrutiny of
Individual Contracts, 40 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 95, 133 (2006) (crediting arbitration clauses with the
"recent renascence of unconscionability as a doctrine that can actually decide cases").
65. Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687-88 n.3 (1996); Perry v. Thomas,
482 U.S. 483, 492-93 n.9 (1987) (stating that a court may not "rely on the uniqueness of an
agreement to arbitrate as a basis for a state-law holding that enforcement would be unconscionable,
for this would enable the court to effect what we hold today the state legislature cannot").
66. Or, in the case of statutory claims, holding an arbitration clause unenforceable as
precluding the claimant from vindicating his or her statutory rights. Burton, supra note 59, at 489.
67. E.g., Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., 298 F.3d 778, 786-87 (9th Cir. 2002)
(applying California law). But see, e.g., Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 428 F.3d 1359, 1378
(11 th Cir. 2005) (applying Georgia law and rejecting challenge to discovery limitation).
68. E.g., Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 935, 938-41 (4th Cir. 1999) (material
breach); Rodriguez v. Windermere Real Estate/Wall St., Inc., 175 P.3d 604, 605 (Wash. Ct. App.
2008) (concluding that a dispute resolution process in which franchisor appoints all arbitrators to
resolve dispute between franchisee and employee "inherently lacks neutrality" and is
unenforceable). But see, e.g., Brockie v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84084,
at *7-*8 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 14, 2007) (rejecting claim that National Arbitration Forum arbitration is
unconscionable on grounds of bias); Bank One, N.A. v. Coates, 125 F. Supp. 2d 819, 835-36 (S.D.
Miss. 2001) (same).
69. E.g., Skirchak v. Dynamics Research Corp., 508 F.3d 49, 51 (1st Cir. 2007) ("Based on
the particular facts of this case, we uphold the striking of the class action waiver on grounds of
unconscionability .. "); Kristian v. Comeast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 64 (1st Cir. 2006) (concluding
that several provisions in arbitration clause, including class arbitration waiver, "would prevent the
vindication of statutory rights" and severing invalid provisions); Leonard v. Terminex Int'l Co., 854
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"

proceeding; 70
Location of the arbitration
71
Cost allocation;

*

Time limits;

*
*
*

Remedy limitations;
Carve-outs from arbitration; 74 and
Confidentiality.75

[Vol. 37:71

72

73

So. 2d 529, 535-39 (Ala. 2002); Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1108 (Cal. 2005);
Tillman v. Commercial Credit Loans, Inc., 655 S.E.2d 362, 373 (N.C. 2008) (holding that "the
provisions of the arbitration clause [including a prohibition on joinder and class actions], taken
together, render it substantively unconscionable because the provisions do not provide plaintiffs
with a forum in which they can effectively vindicate their rights"); Scott v. Cingular Wireless, 161
P.3d 1000, 1007-08 (Wash. 2007) ("We ...conclude that since this clause bars any class action, in
arbitration or without, it functions to exculpate the drafter from liability for a broad range of
undefined wrongful conduct, including potentially intentional wrongful conduct, and that such
exculpation clauses are substantively unconscionable."). But see, e.g., Iberia Credit Bureau v.
Cingular Wireless L.L.C., 379 F.3d 159, 174-75 (5th Cir. 2004); Livingston v. Assocs. Fin., Inc.,
339 F.3d 553, 559 (7th Cir. 2003); Snowden v. CheckPoint Check Cashing, 290 F.3d 631, 638-39
(4th Cir. 2002); Johnson v. West Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366, 377-78 (3d Cir. 2000); Stenzel v.
Dell, Inc., 870 A.2d 133, 144 (Me. 2005) (applying Texas law); see also Spann v. Am. Express
Travel Related Servs. Co., 224 S.W.3d 698, 714-15 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) ("[W]ith the exception of
courts sitting in California, the vast majority of state and federal courts that have considered the
question have rejected the argument that class action and class arbitration waiver clauses are
unconscionable per se.").
70. E.g., Williams v. Aetna Fin. Co., 700 N.E.2d 859, 866 (Ohio 1998). But see, e.g.,
Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Stuart, 85 F.3d 975, 980 (2d Cir. 1996) (upholding location provision in
franchise agreement).
71. E.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 894 (9th Cir. 2002). See generally
Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and ContingentFee Contracts, 59 VAND. L. REv. 729,
750-57 (2006) (reporting results of empirical study of cost-based challenges to arbitration clauses
finding that "the vast majority of cost-based challenges to arbitration agreements were
unsuccessful").
72. E.g., Davis v. O'Melveny & Myers, 485 F.3d 1066, 1076-78 (9th Cir. 2007) (applying
California law and holding that a one-year time limit for bringing claims is unconscionable);
Alexander v. Anthony, Int'l, L.P., 341 F.3d 256, 266-67 (3d Cir. 2003) (finding a 30-day notice
requirement unconscionable). But see, e.g., Bar-Ayal v. Time Warner Cable Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 75972, at *60 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2006) (rejecting unconscionability challenge to one-year
time limit).
73. E.g., State ex rel. Dunlap v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265, 278-80 (W. Va. 2002). But see, e.g.,
Overstreet v. Contigroup Cos., 462 F.3d 409, 412 n.2 (5th Cir. 2006) (applying Georgia law and
upholding a waiver of punitive damages).
74. E.g., E-Z Cash Advance, Inc. v. Harris, 60 S.W.3d 436, 442 (Ark. 2001) (lack of
mutuality); Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 694 (Cal. 2000). But
see, e.g., Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 428 F.3d 1359, 1378 (11 th Cir. 2005) (applying
Georgia law and rejecting a challenge for lack of mutuality). See generally Christopher R. Drahozal,
Nonmutual Agreements to Arbitrate, 27 J. CORP. L. 537, 547 (2002) ("the majority of
courts.. . hold that nonmutual arbitration clauses are not unconscionable").
75. E.g., Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1151-52 (9th Cir. 2003) (applying California law).
But see, e.g., Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless L.L.C., 379 F.3d 159, 175-76 (5th Cir.
2004) (applying Louisiana law and upholding a confidentiality provision).
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In some cases, the courts sever the unenforceable provision (or
provisions) and send the dispute to arbitration; in other cases, the courts
refuse to sever the unenforceable provision and invalidate the entire
arbitration clause.76 In many cases, of course, an equal or greater number
of courts have held virtually identical provisions not to be
unconscionable. 77
Most of the unconscionability cases involve arbitration clauses in
consumer and employment contracts, rather than franchise contracts. But
in Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 78 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit applied the doctrine of unconscionability to
invalidate an arbitration clause in a franchise agreement; 79 the California
Court of Appeal previously had done the same. 80 At least some franchise
lawyers fear that "[t]he Nagrampa ruling and similar California
decisions could be a precursor for courts in California or elsewhere to
extend that8 line of thinking to invalidate other aspects of franchise
contracts." 1
In addition to changes in the legal environment governing the
enforceability of arbitration clauses, other changes in the legal
environment might also cause a flight from arbitration. For example, one
reason parties might agree to arbitrate is to reduce the risk of excessive

76. Booker v. Robert Half Int'l, Inc., 413 F.3d 77, 84-86 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Roberts, J.).
77. See cases cited supra notes 67-75. For a skeptical view of unconscionability in the
arbitration context, see Carbajalv. H & R Block Tax Services, Inc., 372 F.3d 903, 906 (7th Cir.
2004) (Easterbrook, J.) ("The cry of 'unconscionable!' just repackages the tired assertion that
arbitration should be disparaged as second-class adjudication. ... People are free to opt for bargainbasement adjudication-or for that matter, bargain-basement tax preparation services; air carriers
that pack passengers like sardines but charge less; and black-and-white television. In competition,
prices adjust and both sides gain. 'Nothing but the best' may be the motto of a particular consumer
but is not something the legal system foists on all consumers.") and IFC Credit Corp. v. United
Business & IndustrialFederalCredit Union, 512 F.3d 989, 993 (7th Cir. 2008) (Easterbrook, C.J.)
("If buyers prefer juries, then an agreement waiving a jury comes with a lower price to compensate
buyers for the loss .... As long as the price is negotiable and the customer may shop elsewhere,
consumer protection comes from competition rather than judicial intervention.").
78. 469 F.3d 1257 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
79. Id. at 1294.
80. Indep. Ass'n of Mail Box Ctr. Owners v. Mail Boxes Etc., USA, Inc., 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d
659, 676 (Ct. App. 2005); see also McGuire v. Coolbrands Smoothies Franchise L.L.C., No.
H030202, 2007 WL 2381545, at *15 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2007).
81. Marek, supra note 7, at 9 (paraphrasing comments by Carmen Caruso, then of Schwartz
Cooper in Chicago, 111.); see also Barry M. Heller & Peter Lagarias, Navigating Nagrampa:
Drafting and Contesting the Arbitration Clause 15 (Oct. 10-12, 2007) (unpublished paper, prepared
for the ABA 30th Annual Forum on Franchising) (on file with the Hofstra Law Review) ("Mr.
Heller believes that other states will not adopt the Nagrampa approach .... Mr. Lagarias believes
that the application of basic unconscionability principles, endemic to virtually all states, will likely
result in contests to arbitration clauses in franchise agreements.").
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punitive damages awards. 82 If, say as a result of United States Supreme
Court cases recognizing due process limits on punitive damages
awards,83 drafting parties perceive that the risk of excessive punitive
damages awards in court has decreased,
they may be less likely to use
84
arbitration to resolve their disputes.
3. Changing Business Conditions
A final reason the drafting party might flee arbitration is because of
changes in the business conditions facing the parties. In the franchise
industry, the growth and maturity of the franchise system over time are
possible reasons a franchisor might change its view of arbitration.
Drahozal and Hylton found no effect of maturity on the use of
arbitration, but did find that franchisors with growing networks were less
likely to include arbitration clauses in their contracts, at least for
franchises with relatively little repeat business.85 Or the acquisition of
the franchisor or a change in the law firm representing the franchisor
might prompt a reconsideration of the provisions in the franchise
agreement, including the dispute resolution clause.
B. Flight by Non-DraftingParties
Although commentators have focused on the drafting party, the
non-drafting party also might "flee" arbitration. Non-drafting parties
might prefer to enter into contracts without arbitration clauses; if so, the
market might penalize firms that use arbitration clauses. At some point
one would expect the drafting party to revise its contract to remove the
arbitration clause (that is, for the drafting party to flee arbitration). But
until that happens, flight from arbitration might manifest itself in a
declining market share for drafting parties that use arbitration clauses.
Whether flight by non-drafting parties is likely to occur underlies
much of the debate over consumer and employment (and franchise)
arbitration. Critics argue that consumers and employees do not
meaningfully consent to arbitration clauses in standard form contracts

82. Drahozal & Hylton, supra note 6, at 574.
83. E.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425, 429 (2003); BMW
of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 585-86 (1996).
84. Dunham & Lockerby, supra note 10, at 26 ("Given the current state of the law, every
franchisor's operating assumption should be that those [constitutional] standards do not apply to
arbitration awards, including judicial orders confirming those awards.").
85. Drahozal & Hylton, supra note 6, at 575-77. Another possible change in business
conditions that might affect the use of arbitration clauses is the acquisition of a franchisor by a party
with a different view of the costs and benefits of arbitration.
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because they do not know the clauses are there, do not understand the
clauses if they notice them, and have no choice but to enter into the
agreement. 86 As a result, the critics assert, the market does not constrain
the abusive use of arbitration clauses by businesses.8 7 Supporters of
consumer and employment arbitration, by contrast, have more faith in
the market as a means of ensuring that consumers benefit from
arbitration.8 8
Regardless of one's views on consumer and employment
arbitration, franchisees differ from consumers and employees in several
important respects. First, franchisees are business people, and at least
some franchisees are very sophisticated business people-including
publicly-traded companies.8 9 Second, the market for franchise
opportunities is highly competitive, and franchisees have the option to
choose between franchisors that use arbitration and those that do not. 90
Third, state franchising laws and Federal Trade Commission regulations
provide for conspicuous notice of arbitration clauses (as well as clauses
specifying the location of the arbitration or court proceeding) in
franchise disclosure documents made available to franchisees before
they purchase the franchise. 9' Indeed, some states require the franchisor
to register and make the disclosure documents publicly available before

86. See Drahozal, supra note 13, at 706-07; Eisenberg et al., supra note 28, at 872-73;
Schwartz, supra note 2, at 56-57.
87. Schwartz, supra note 2, at 58-60; Sternlight, Panacea,supra note 2, at 686-93; Jean R.
Stemlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to Eliminate Consumer Class Actions: Efficient
Business Practiceor UnconscionableAbuse?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 92-99 (2004).
88. Peter B. Rutledge, Wither Arbitration?,6 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 549 (2008); Stephen J.
Ware, Paying the Price of Process: JudicialRegulation of Consumer Arbitration Agreements, 2001
J. DIsP. RESOL. 89, 91-93; Stephen J. Ware, The Case for Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration
Agreements-with ParticularConsiderationof Class Actions and Arbitration Fees, 5 J. AM. ARB.
251, 254-57 (2006).
89. E.g., Broussard v. Meineke Disc. Muffler Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 331, 348 (4th Cir. 1998)
("By all lights, Meineke franchisees are independent, sophisticated, if sometimes small,
businessmen who dealt with Meineke at arms' length and pursued their own business interests.");
Franchise Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. 57,320 (proposed Oct. 22, 1999) ("[C]ommenters note that franchising
today may involve heavily-negotiated, multi-million dollar deals between franchisors and highly
sophisticated individual and corporate franchisees who are represented by counsel.").
90. Benjamin Klein, Market Power in FranchiseCases in the Wake of Kodak: Applying PostContract Hold-Up Analysis to Vertical Relationships, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 283, 286 (1999)
("Because potential franchisees have many choices available pre-contract, franchisors have no
market power when negotiating franchise contracts."); see infra text accompanying notes 112-18.
91. Drahozal, supra note 13, at 766-67. On March 30, 2007, the Federal Trade Commission
adopted a new Franchise Rule, which modifies some of the requirements for franchise disclosure
documents. See generally 72 Fed. Reg. 15,444 (Mar. 30, 2007) (amending 16 C.F.R. § 436 (1986)).
The rule permits franchisors to follow the previous requirements until July 1, 2008. Id.
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the franchisor can sell franchises in the state. 92 For all these reasons, in
our view, a market response to arbitration clauses by franchisees is even
more likely than by consumers and employees.9 3
Nonetheless, how well the market works ultimately is an empirical
question, which we do not purport to answer here. Thus, any absence of
flight by non-drafting parties is ambiguous. One possible interpretation
would be that non-drafting parties do not flee arbitration because they
benefit from pre-dispute arbitration clauses. Another possible
interpretation would be that non-drafting parties do not flee arbitration
because they do not know about or do not understand the significance of
arbitration clauses in standard form contracts.
C. Modifying Arbitration Clauses as an Alternative to Flight
An alternative response to fleeing arbitration altogether is for the
drafting party to modify its arbitration clause to address the reasons for
its dissatisfaction with arbitration. The type of drafting response will
vary with the reason or reasons for the drafting party's dissatisfaction.
One possible reason is dissatisfaction with the arbitration process
itself. The party's experience with arbitration may lead it to believe that
arbitration is not as fast and inexpensive as it once believed, for
example. 94 Or the party may have received what it perceives to be an
unjustified or aberrational award by the arbitrator. Possible drafting
responses include: (1) changing the arbitration rules specified in the
contract to those promulgated by a different (lower-cost) provider; (2)
changing the number of arbitrators (capping the number at one if cost is
the concern; providing for a three-arbitrator panel if arbitrator
decisionmaking is the issue); 95 (3) limiting discovery; and (4) providing
for some sort of appeals process or expanding the grounds on which
courts can review awards. The tradeoff between these sorts of changes
should be clear: Changes that reduce the risk of aberrational awards

92. See Fed. Trade Comm'n, State Offices Administering Franchise Disclosure Laws,
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/franchise/netdiscl.shtm (last visited Jan. 15, 2009) (listing California,
Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, North Dakota, Oregon,

Rhode Island, South Dakota, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin).
93. Which does not necessarily mean that there is no market response for consumers and
employees.
94.

Whiteman, supra note 4 ("One of the main complaints is the expense. If the opposing

party demands a trial, the resulting court sessions can easily run up a six-figure tab before any of the
original issues are resolved.").
95. See infra text accompanying notes 150-51.
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(such as increasing the number of arbitrators or providing9 6 for expanded
judicial review) are likely to increase cost, and vice versa.
Another possible reason for concern is the process for enforcing the
arbitration agreement. As discussed above, some courts have held
provisions in arbitration clauses unconscionable, either invalidating the
entire arbitration clause or else striking the offending provision and then
sending the case to arbitration under the arbitration clause as modified.97
Drafting parties may respond to such court decisions by modifying the
arbitration clause to remove or alter the potentially objectionable
provisions. Several franchising lawyers have predicted that such changes
98
are likely to occur after the Ninth Circuit's decision in Nagrampa.
D. Summary and Recap
The rest of this Article 99will test three sets of questions concerning
the "flight" from arbitration:
1. Are franchisors fleeing arbitration-that is, have franchisors
replaced the arbitration clauses in their franchise agreements with some
other form of dispute resolution clause?
2. Are franchisees fleeing arbitration-that is, has the share of
franchised units for franchisors with arbitration clauses in their franchise
agreements declined relative to those with other types of dispute
resolution clauses?
3. Are franchisors modifying the arbitration clauses in their
franchise agreements either (a) to remove or alter provisions in response
to the franchisor's dissatisfaction with the arbitration process; or (b) to
remove or alter provisions that courts have held unconscionable or
otherwise unenforceable?

96. See infra text accompanying notes 158-59.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 66-76.
98. Heller & Lagarias, supra note 81, at 15 ("Franchisors with a significant number of
franchisees based in California will most likely redraft any arbitration clauses in their agreements to
seek to avoid the bases upon which the Nagrampa Court voided the clause there."); Marek, supra
note 7, at 9 ("[S]ome attorneys ... believe that franchisors will simply fine-tune arbitration clauses
to conform with recent decisions.").
99. One possibility that we do not investigate is whether the franchisor and franchisee agree
to waive the contractual arbitration agreement after a dispute arises, what might be called "postdispute flight from arbitration." We have no indications that this is happening on any widespread
basis, and have no data we can use to examine the possibility.
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Is THERE A FLIGHT FROM ARBITRATION?

This Part of the Article tests empirically whether parties are fleeing
arbitration, or otherwise modifying their arbitration clauses, in response
to their dissatisfaction with arbitration. We compare the dispute
resolution clauses in a sample of franchise agreements from the same
franchisors in 1999 and 2007 to determine the extent to which, if at all,
the franchisors changed the clauses over time. We find little evidence
that franchisors as a whole have fled arbitration, although some
franchisors have eliminated arbitration clauses from their franchise
agreements (while others have added arbitration clauses). Nor do we
find any evidence of a "flight" from arbitration by franchisees.
Franchisors have modified their arbitration clauses to some degree. The
most common changes have been to add a class arbitration waiver and to
provide for one arbitrator instead of three.100 Class arbitration waivers
arguably evidence a slight, partial flight from arbitration and reducing
the number of arbitrators signifies franchisor efforts to hold down the
cost of the arbitration process.
A.

Sample and Data

The sample consists of seventy-five leading franchisors that were
ranked at the top of Entrepreneur Magazine's Franchise 500 in 1999
and that had franchise disclosure documents on file with the Minnesota
Department of Commerce at the time. 10 1 The dispute resolution clauses
from the 1999 franchise agreements were collected that year; the results

of that study previously have been published. 10 2 For this Article, we
100. See infra tbls.8 & 11.
101. Drahozal, supra note 13, at 722-24. Minnesota is one of a minority of states that require
franchisors to register with the state before selling franchises there. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80C.02
(West 1999). At the time the data were collected, the required registration materials included a
Uniform Franchise Offering Circular (containing detailed information about the franchisor and the
franchised business) and a copy of the franchise agreement, which were the source of most of the
data used in this study. MINN. R. 2860.3500(15)-.3800 (2007). We are aware of no relevant change
in Minnesota franchise law during the period studied. As noted above, on March 30, 2007, the
Federal Trade Commission modified its Franchise Rule, including its disclosure requirements. See
supra note 91. We saw no indication that franchisors were already following the amended
disclosure requirements in the disclosure documents we examined, and even if they were, the
amended requirements would not have affected our results.
102. See generally Drahozal, supra note 13; Drahozal & Hylton, supra note 6. For an extension
of the earlier study, see William L. Killion, An Informal Study of Arbitration Clauses Reveals
SurprisingResults, 22 FRANCHISE L.J. 79, 79 (2002) ("1 looked at the dispute resolution provisions
in the franchise agreements for the next fifty franchises in the Entrepreneurlisting on file with the
[Minnesota Department of Commerce]. Thirty-six contain arbitration clauses while fourteen do not.
Thus, 72 percent of the franchise agreements contain commitments to arbitrate.").
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collected the dispute resolution clauses for the same franchisors for 2007
from the Minnesota Department of Commerce, giving us a basis for
identifying changes in the clauses over time. Although we collected the
data in Minnesota, the franchise agreements we examined (with one
standard form contracts used by franchisors on a
exception) were
03
1
basis.
national
Our current sample consists of seventy-one of the original seventyfive franchisors. Since the original study, one of the franchisors merged
into another (Q Lube merged into Jiffy Lube, with all Q Lube locations
becoming Jiffy Lubes'°4), and thus is removed from the sample as a
separate observation. In addition, five other franchisors are no longer
registered in Minnesota,10 5 so that the current disclosure documents and
franchise agreements are no longer available from the Minnesota
Department of Commerce. Of those five, we were able to obtain the
franchise documents of two from an online database of franchise filings
maintained by the California Department of Corporations. ° 6 For each
franchise agreement, we classified the dispute resolution clause and
various provisions of the dispute resolution clause, as discussed
below. 107
103. The agreements do vary by state, but the variations are reflected in state-specific addenda
attached to the standard form franchise agreements. See infra note 136. For the one exception, see
infra note 107.
104. J. Dee Hill, Jiffy Lube Showdown, ADWEEK, Nov. 1, 1999, available at
http://www.adweek.com/aw/esearch/article display.jsp?vnu contentid=532701.
105. The five that are no longer registered in Minnesota are CD Warehouse, Inc., Century
Small Business (acquired by Fiducial), Padgett Business Services, Pizza Inn, Inc., and Yogen Frtiz
U.S.A. Inc. In addition, since 1999, the Prudential Real Estate Brokerage Franchise Agreement had
been replaced by two new filings: the Prudential Real Estate Affiliates, Inc. Franchise Agreement
and the Prudential Commercial Real Estate Brokerage Franchise Agreement. The dispute resolution
clauses in the latter two franchise agreements are identical and so did not affect the results here. In
reporting the number of Prudential franchisees in Table 6, see infra text accompanying note 127, we
combined the numbers for both (which was immaterial anyway because there were only thirty-two
Prudential commercial real estate brokerage franchisees in 2007).
106. Cal. Dep't of Corps., California Electronic Access to Securities Information and Franchise
Information, http://134.186.208.228/caleasi/pub/exsearch.htm (enter company name in the search
field) (last visited Jan. 15, 2009). From the California database, we were able to obtain a copy of
dispute resolution clauses from the Century Small Business (Fiducial) franchise agreement (from a
Franchise Registration filing dated March 14, 2005) and the Yogen Frfz U.S.A. Inc. franchise
agreement (from a Franchise Registration filing dated December 14, 2007). Unfortunately for our
purposes, California exempts all franchisors above a certain size from state filing requirements, so
that virtually all of the franchisors in our sample need file only a request for exemption, and not a
disclosure document and franchise agreement, with the State.
107. The one franchise agreement that was difficult to characterize was that of Jani-King
(commercial cleaning). In 1999, the Jani-King franchise agreement contained an exclusive forum
selection clause. Jani-King, Associate Franchise Agreement I 11.10, at 20 (1999) (on file with the
Hofstra Law Review). In 2007, the franchise agreement-with Jani-King of Minnesota, Inc. as the
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Tables 3, 4, and 5 provide summary information on the franchises
in the sample.10 8 The franchises studied provide a cross-section of the
franchise industry-as to the product or service provided, the year the
franchisor began franchising, and the number of franchised units.
Although the Franchise500 is a widely used source of data for research
on franchising, 0 9 it is not a representative sample of all franchises. As
can be seen in Tables 2 and 3, it tends to include larger, more established
franchises." 0 If franchisors of newer and smaller franchises are more
likely to make changes to their franchise agreements, perhaps because
their smaller franchisee base leaves them less locked-in to existing
franchisor-contained no dispute resolution clause. See generally Jani-King of Minnesota, Inc.,
Franchise Agreement 20 (2006) (on file with the Hofstra Law Review). Jani-King apparently now
uses a different corporate entity for each state's franchises. As a result, there is little need to specify
an exclusive forum for dispute resolution, since all disputes would be between a Minnesota
franchisor and a Minnesota franchisee. In effect, even in the absence of a clause, the franchise
agreement likely functions much the same as if it had an exclusive forum selection clause, and so
we classified it as such.
108. Because the sample includes almost all of the franchises in the original article, Tables I
and 2 are almost identical to those in Drahozal, supra note 13, at 725. Table 3 differs to a greater
degree, principally because the data available at the time of the earlier study included not only
United States franchises, but worldwide franchises. For this Article, we use only data on the number
of United States franchised locations.
109. For examples, see Jonathan Klick et al., The Effect of Contract Regulation: The Case of
Franchising 18 (Fla. State Univ. College of Law, Law & Econ. Paper No. 07/001, 2006), available
at http://ssm.com/abstract=951464 ("We chose those fast food firms that ranked most highly on
Entrepreneur Magazine's Franchise 500 which satisfied the data availability constraint." (footnote
omitted)); Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Contract and Jurisdictional Freedom, in THE
FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 344 & nn.134, 137 (F.H. Buckley ed., 1999) (relying on
an "Entrepreneur Magazine sample"). For discussions of potential biases (or lack thereof) in using
the Franchise 500 as a data source, see, for example, John E. Clarkin & Robert B. Hasbrouck, The
Franchise 500 as a Research Tool: How Objective and Reliable Is It?, 14 J. SMALL BUS. &
ENTERPRISE DEV. 144, 145 (2007) ("The number of respondents to the magazine's survey indicates
an apparent willingness by franchisors to participate .... [T]he dataset has been found to be
comparable to other respected sources of franchise information."); James G. Combs & Gary J.
Castrogiovanni, Franchisor Strategy: A Proposed Model and Empirical Test of Franchise Versus
Company Ownership, J. SMALL BUS. MGMT., Apr. 1994, at 37, 42 ("Bias [in inclusion in the
Franchise 500], however, seems minimal because franchisors have considerable incentive to be
listed...."); Francine Lafontaine, A Critical Appraisal of Data Sources on Franchising, in
FRANCHISING: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES AND RESEARCH 5, 15 (Patrick J. Kaufmass & Rajiv P. Dant,
eds., 1995) (describing Entrepreneur Magazine's Franchise 500 as providing "the most detailed
longitudinal data set on individual franchisors").
110. See Gary J. Castrogiovanni et al., Franchise Failure Rates: An Assessment of Magnitude
and Influencing Factors, J. SMALL BUS. MGMT., Apr. 1993, at 105, 106 (comparing a random
sample of franchisors selected from the directory of the International Franchise Association to those
listed in Entrepreneur Magazine and finding that "sample members tended to be older and larger
[than those listed in Entrepreneur Magazine]," although "those age and size differences were not
statistically significant"); Lafontaine, supra note 109, at 6-7 ("the sample of franchisors for which
detailed data are available are biased toward larger and older franchisors, as well entrants [into
franchising]").
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franchising agreements, 1' we may not be observing the sorts of
franchises where a flight from arbitration is most likely to take place.
Conversely, however, if a flight from arbitration takes place only among
small or new franchises, it affects a much smaller body of contracts than
if flight were occurring among larger and more established franchises.

Table 1. Product or Service Provided
Food Service & Restaurants
Various Retail
Business & Accounting Services
Cleaning Services
Travel Services
Automobile Services
Hair Care Services
Real Estate
Fitness Center
Training Services
Other

24
9
8
6
6
5
4
3
2
2
2

Table 2. Year Began Franchising
1990s
1980s
1970s
1960s
1950s
1940s
1930s
1920s

6
29
15
11
6
2
1
1

111. Of course, as seen infra Part IV.D, the franchisors in our sample do make changes to their
dispute resolution clauses, so any lock-in of larger franchisors is not absolute.
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Table 3. Number of Franchises, 2006
<500
500-1000
1000-2000
2000-3000
3000-4000
4000-5000
5000-10,000
>10,000

16
18
14
7
1
7
6
2

B. Are FranchisorsFleeing Arbitration?

Based on our sample, we find little evidence that franchisors as a
whole are fleeing arbitration by removing arbitration clauses from their
franchise agreements. The percentage of franchisors in the sample that
used arbitration clauses declined only slightly between 1999 and

2007.112 Of the seventy-one franchisors for which we were able to obtain
the dispute resolution clause for both years, 45.1% (thirty-two of
seventy-one) included an arbitration clause in 1999 and 43.7% (thirtyone of seventy-one) included an arbitration clause in 2007.'13 Stated
otherwise, on net, one fewer franchisor in the sample used an arbitration
clause in 2007 than in 1999. By comparison, the use of exclusive forum
selection clauses increased more substantially-from 38.0% (twentyseven of seventy-one) in 1999 to 45.1% (thirty-two of seventy-one) in
2007.114

Even the slight decline in the number of franchisors using
arbitration clauses is misleading because of a change in the sample noted
above. Q Lube, an oil change service franchisor, was included in the
112. Seeinfratb.4.
113. See infra tbl.4. These results are updated slightly from preliminary results reported in the
NationalLaw Journal in August 2007. See Marek, supra note 7, at 8 ("About 45% of major U.S.
franchisors mandated arbitration in the agreements they signed last year with franchisees, according
to preliminary research by Christopher Drahozal, a law professor at the University of Kansas. That's
about the same as the figure Drahozal found based on 1999 data in earlier research .... "). Since
that story was published, we have been able to track down the dispute resolution clauses of several
additional franchise agreements in the original sample; hence, the slightly different percentages
from the preliminary results reported previously. The preliminary results do not differ materially
from our current results.
114. See infra tbl.4.
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1999 sample, and its franchise agreement contained an exclusive forum
selection clause.1 15 Q Lube is not included in the 2007 sample because it
was merged with Jiffy Lube International, Inc. After the acquisition, all16
former Q Lube franchises were converted into Jiffy Lube franchises.'
As a result, those franchisees presumably are now governed by the Jiffy
Lube franchise agreement-which includes an arbitration clause.
Effectively, the exclusive forum selection clause in the 1999 Q Lube
agreement has been switched to an arbitration clause. 1 7 Again, because
Q Lube no longer exists as a separate franchisor, the switch does not
appear in the results reported in Table 4. But had we done so, both the
number and the percentage of franchisors using arbitration clauses
would have been unchanged from 1999 to 2007.18

Table 4. Dispute Resolution Clauses in Franchise Agreements

Arbitration Clause
Exclusive Forum Selection Clause
Nonexclusive Forum Selection
Clause
No Dispute Resolution Clause

1999

2007

32
(45.1%)
27
(38.0%)
4
(5.6%)
8
(11.3%)

31
(43.7%)
32
(45.1%)
5
(7.0%)
3
(4.2%)

So far, we have been describing aggregate results-the overall
percentage of franchisors that include an arbitration clause in their
franchise agreement. Table 5 lists the number of franchisors who
switched the form of dispute resolution clause in their franchise
agreement between 1999 and 2007. As Table 5 shows, although on net
there has been little change in the frequency of arbitration clauses, a
115.

See infra tbl.4 (noting results of that study).

116.
117.

See supra text accompanying note 104.
See Hill, supra note 104; supra text accompanying note 104; see also infra tbl.4

(documenting results of the study).
118. Note that the percentage of franchisors that use arbitration clauses is not equivalent to the
percentage of franchise agreements that include arbitration clauses. The number of franchised units
varies across franchisors. Drahozal, supra note 13, at 773-75. Not all franchisees for a particular
franchisor necessarily have the same dispute resolution clause in their franchise agreement. See
infra note 125.
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number of franchisors in fact switched their dispute resolution clauses.
Of the thirty-two franchisors that included an arbitration clause in their
franchise agreements in 1999, four (or 12.5%) had replaced it with an
exclusive forum selection clause by 2007.119 At the same time, three of
the eight (37.5%) franchisors with no dispute resolution clause had
added an arbitration clause, 20 so that on net there was little change in
the use of arbitration clauses. This reshuffling may explain some of the
anecdotal reports of a flight from arbitration.121
One limitation of our data is that we do not know the timing of the
switches. The franchisors switching away from arbitration may have
made the change more recently than the franchisors switching to
arbitration. If so, there would have been some flight from arbitration not
visible from our data. Conversely, the franchisors switching to
arbitration may have made the change more recently than the franchisors
switching away from arbitration. In that case, there would in fact be a
flight to arbitration. Unfortunately, our data do not permit us to
22
determine whether either of these scenarios in fact has occurred. 1

119. See infratbl.5.
120. See infra tbl.5.
121. A possible extension of this Article would be to examine the reasons why the franchisors
that switched away from arbitration did so. Some simple quantitative analysis may be possiblesuch as comparing the switching franchisors to (1) other switching franchisors; (2) franchisors in the
group switched from; and (3) franchisors in the group switched to, with respect to a number of
characteristics: average size, growth rate, percent of company-owned outlets, high versus low
externality business, whether it had been acquired, and so forth. Because of the small number of
franchisors that changed dispute resolution clauses during the period studied, however, the
quantitative analysis may not provide meaningful results.
122. By comparison, in examining the use of arbitration clauses in executive employment
contracts, Thomas et al. find "an upward trend in the use of arbitration over time from a low of
35.9% of contracts in 1997 to 60.4% of contracts in 2005." Thomas et al., supra note 16, at 21.
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Table 5. Changes in Clauses, 1999-2007
Arbitration Clause: Net Change -1
From No Dispute Resolution Clause +3
To Exclusive Forum Selection Clause -4
Exclusive Forum Selection Clause: Net Change +5
From Arbitration Clause +4
From No Dispute Resolution Clause +1
Nonexclusive Forum Selection Clause: Net Change +1
From No Dispute Resolution Clause +1
No Dispute Resolution Clause: Net Change -5
To Arbitration Clause -3
To Exclusive Forum Selection Clause -1
To Nonexclusive Forum Selection Clause -1
At bottom, although there are some limitations to our data, we find
little evidence that franchisors are fleeing arbitration. The percentage of
franchise agreements that included arbitration clauses has declined only
slightly (from 45.1% to 43.7%) since 1999,123 and those data do not
reflect the acquisition of one franchisor by another that effectively
resulted in a switch to arbitration for the acquired franchisor. That said,
the aggregate data mask the fact that some franchisors (four of thirtytwo, or 12.5%) did flee arbitration for litigation, while other franchisors
fled litigation for arbitration,
leaving the overall use of arbitration
124
clauses largely unchanged.
C. Are FranchiseesFleeing Arbitration?
The parties that draft standard form contracts are not the only ones
that might flee arbitration. In addition, the non-drafting parties-those

123.
124.

See supratbl.4.
A June 2008 article in the Wall Street Journal quotes an in-house attorney for Kahala

Corp., the franchisor for Blimpie submarine sandwiches, as stating that Kahala "favors resolving
issues with franchisees in court." Gibson, supra note 7, at B7. The 2007 Blimpie franchise
agreement is one of those in our sample that included an arbitration clause. Following up on the
Wall Street Journal article, we examined the 2008 Blimpie franchise agreement and found that it,

indeed, now contains an exclusive forum selection clause instead of an arbitration clause. Kahala
Franchise Corp., Blimpie Franchise Agreement 16.3, at 47 (2008) (on file with the Hofstra Law
Review). Thus, one additional franchisor has switched away from arbitration subsequent to the time
period we studied.
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presented with standard form contracts to sign-might also flee
arbitration. This flight might manifest itself in decisions by the drafting
party to stop using a pre-dispute arbitration clause. In other words, flight
by non-drafting parties might induce flight by drafting parties. As
discussed above, there is little evidence of such flight.
But flight by non-drafting parties might also manifest itself in a
decline in the number of contracts entered into with drafting parties that
use arbitration clauses. If the non-drafting parties prefer standard form
contracts without arbitration clauses, one would expect (all else being
equal) some decline in the number of contracts with arbitration
clauses-at least relative to the number of contracts with other dispute
resolution clauses.
The number of franchised units for each franchise system is not a
perfect measure of the number of franchise agreements with a particular
type of dispute resolution clause. 25 Nor is the change in the number of
franchised units a perfect measure of whether there is a flight from
arbitration. 126 Nonetheless, examining the change in the number and
percentage of franchised units for franchisors with each type of dispute
resolution clause provides a very simple test for whether there has been
flight from arbitration.
Table 6 reports the results. This Table summarizes the number of
franchised units for all franchisors using each type of dispute resolution
clause in 2000 and 2006.127 The number of franchised units in systems in
which the franchisor included an arbitration clause in its franchise
agreement increased from 57,401 to 76,166, or by 32.7%, from 1999 to
2006.128 As a percentage of all franchised locations, the share of
franchised units in systems with arbitration clauses increased from
43.3% to 46.0% over the same time period.12 9 Although the share of
franchise locations in systems with exclusive forum selection clauses
increased significantly more (from 30.5% to 39.1%), 130 that hardly
evidences a flight from arbitration.
125. For example, in 1996, only 58% of Dairy Queen franchisees involved in class action
litigation with the company had franchise agreements that included arbitration clauses; the
remaining 42% did not. Collins v. Int'l Dairy Queen, Inc., 168 F.R.D. 668, 677 (M.D. Ga. 1996).

126. A better measure would be to examine changes in the number of new franchises together
with the number of renewals of franchise agreements for each franchisor. But we do not have those
data for all the necessary years.
127. We used data from 2000 because unlike the available data from 1999, the data from 2000
reported United States franchised units rather than worldwide franchised units. See supra note 108,
Similarly, we used data from 2006 instead of 2007 because it was more complete.
128. See infratbl.6.
129. See infra tbl.6.
130. See infra tbl.6.
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Table 6. Total United States Franchised Units by Type of Dispute
Resolution Clause, 2000 & 2006131

Arbitration Clause
Exclusive Forum Selection Clause
Nonexclusive Forum Selection Clause
No Dispute Resolution Clause

2000
57,401
(43.3%)
40,380
(30.5%)
5982
(4.5%)
28,817
(21.7%)

2006
76,166
(46.0%)
64,690
(39.1%)
7003
(4.2%)
17,545
(10.6%)

D. Are FranchisorsModifying Their Arbitration Clauses?
Alternatively, we consider the possibility that, instead of fleeing
arbitration altogether, franchisors are modifying their arbitration clauses
in response to their dissatisfaction with arbitration. This Part considers
three types of changes that franchisors might make. First, in response to
court decisions
holding
provisions
in arbitration
clauses
32
unconscionable,1 the franchisor might eliminate or modify provisions
frequently challenged in court.133 Second, the franchisor might eliminate
or modify provisions that increase the cost of arbitration. Third, the
franchisor might add or34modify provisions to reduce the perceived risk
of aberrational awards. 1

131. Our first choice as the data source for Table 6 was EntrepreneurMagazine's Franchise
500 for 2000 and 2006. If the data was unavailable from that source, we used the nearest available
years of the Franchise500, Bond's Franchise Guide, or Item 10 of the Uniform Franchise Offering

Circular for the franchisor, as most appropriate. We resolved any uncertainties in the data in the way
that offered least support for the hypothesis examined.
132. See supratext accompanying notes 64-81.
133. The franchisor might modify the provisions because of the risk that the arbitration clause
will be invalidated, because of the expense of litigating the issue in court, or because of costs to its
reputation for fair dealing.
134. Another possibility, which we do not evaluate here, is that the franchisor might modify
non-dispute resolution terms of the franchise agreement, such as the upfront investment required or
the royalty charged the franchisee. See Heller & Lagarias, supra note 81, at 16 ("One suggestion is
to draft the franchise agreement to provide the franchisor's home state as the forum for any
arbitration in exchange for the franchisee paying a reduced initial franchise fee.").
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This Part examines how, if at all, those franchisors that continue to
include arbitration clauses in their contracts have changed their
arbitration clauses since 1999.135 We begin with the same sample as
above, but focus only on the twenty-eight franchisors that included
arbitration clauses in their franchise agreements in both 1999 and 2007.
We examine an array of provisions in those franchise arbitration clauses:
provisions dealing with (1) the choice of arbitration provider; (2)
arbitrator selection; (3) discovery; (4) judicial review of awards; (5)
class arbitration; (6) location of arbitration proceedings; (7) arbitration
costs; (8) time limits on claims; (9) punitive damages
limitations; and
36
(10) carve-outs (that is, exceptions from arbitration).1
Choice of Arbitration Provider. Some franchisors and other
drafting parties have expressed dissatisfaction with the rules and costs of
the AAA. 13 7 The rules specified in the arbitration clause address a wide
range of issues, although in many cases the parties remain able to
modify the rules in their arbitration clause. 38 In addition, by specifying
that the AAA is to administer the arbitration proceeding, the parties are
agreeing to pay the AAA to provide administrative services. Those costs
depend on the amount in dispute, but can be substantial for large
39
claims.

1

Table 7 summarizes the choice of arbitration provider in the clauses
studied. In 1999, the choice was unanimous: All twenty-eight
135. In this context, and unlike the use of arbitration clauses as discussed supra text
accompanying note 121, the aggregate data do not mask offsetting changes in the use of the
provisions, and so we report only the aggregate numbers.
136. The results presented in the text are based on the provisions of the franchise agreements
attached to the franchisor's disclosure documents. In addition, franchise agreements commonly
contain state-specific addenda, which modify the provisions of the franchise agreements for
franchisees located in a particular state. All of the state-specific addenda in the sample are for
franchisees located in states with franchise registration requirements, and all appear to be changes in
response to regulatory action rather than any court decision. Some of the addenda modify provisions
of the dispute resolution clause, most commonly to require arbitration to take place in the
franchisee's home state, but very rarely to override a waiver of punitive damages, a time limit on
bringing a claim, or a cost-shifting provision. See, e.g., North Dakota Securities Department,
Registration
Requirements,
Franchise,
http://www.ndsecurities.com/registrations/
(select
"Registration of Franchises") (last visited Dec. 12, 2008).
137. Marek, supra note 7, at 9 ("'There are a lot of people who are not happy with the process
of the American Arbitration Association or its rules."' (quoting Rupert Barkoff)); Dunham &
Lockerby, supra note 10, at 12 ("The AAA is a venerable organization, but its administrative fees
can be high, and as a result of a recent consolidation of its offices, the quality of the administrative
staff (including its knowledge of the skills and experience of potential arbitrators) can leave
something to be desired. Most important, standard AAA arbitration pools vary widely in caliber.").
138. W. Mark C. Weidemaier, The Arbitration Clause in Context: How Contract Terms Do
(and Do Not) Define the Process, 40 CREIGHTON L. REV. 655, 667 (2007).
139. Drahozal, supra note 13, at 736.
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franchisors in the sample specified the AAA in their arbitration
clauses. 140 In 2007, only twenty-four of twenty-eight (85.7%) specified
the AAA. 14 1 One clause specified JAMS (originally Judicial Arbitration
and Mediation Services), and three others set out a list of possible
choices.1 42 The list typically included the AAA, but permitted the parties
(or the franchisor) to choose an alternative.

Table 7. Choice of Arbitration Provider

AAA
JAMS
Choice Among Providers

1999
28
(100%)
0
(0.0%)
0
(0.0%)

2007
24
(85.7%)
1
(3.6%)
3
(10.7%)

Thus, since 1999 there has been some shift away from the AAA,
although the substantial majority of franchise arbitration clauses still
choose the AAA. Interestingly, while JAMS was the most commonly
specified alternative provider (albeit only in two clauses), the other
providers specified (as possible choices among various alternatives)
were United States Arbitration and Mediation Midwest, Inc. (located in
St. Louis, Missouri),143 and the American Dispute Resolution Center
(located in Connecticut),144 two lesser known arbitration providers.
Arbitrator Selection. A neutral decisionmaker is central to the
fairness of an arbitration proceeding (and to the enforceability of an

140. Actually, one arbitration clause in 1999 did not provide for the AAA to administer the
arbitration, instead providing that the arbitration be conducted "under the then-prevailing
commercial arbitration rules of a recognized independent alternate dispute resolution service to be
selected by Franchisor such as the American Arbitration Association, JAMS/Endispute or United
States Mediation and Arbitration." GNC Franchising, Inc., Agreement I XXVI(C), at 42 (1999) (on
file with the Hofstra Law Review). Because GNC no longer includes an arbitration clause in its
franchise agreement (the GNC franchise agreement now contains an exclusive forum selection
clause), GNC is not included in this sample.
141.
142.
143.

Seeinfratbl.7.
See infratl.7.
Medicine Shoppe/Medicap Pharmacy, Franchise License Agreement

(2007) (on file with the Hofstra Law Review).
144. Doctor's Assocs., Inc., Franchise Agreement

XIV(D)(01), at 29

10(a), at 11 (2007) (on file with the

Hofstra Law Review).
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arbitration clause).145 Among the 1999 franchise agreements, only one
arbitration clause included an arbitrator selection procedure that was
potentially problematic. The Schlotzsky's, Inc. arbitration clause
required all arbitrators to be employed (within the preceding twelve
months) in a "Qualified Food Service Position," which it defined as a
"Corporate Officer or Area Supervisor (or equivalent) for a multi-unit,
quick service (including fast food) restaurant or chain (exclusive of
drive-in and chains specializing in chicken), having annual system wide
gross sales in excess of Two Hundred Million Dollars
($200,000,000.00).,,146 By limiting the pool of arbitrators essentially to
corporate officials of large fast-food companies, the Schlotzsky's, Inc.
clause was subject to legal challenge on unconscionability and other
grounds. By 2007, the Schlotzsky's, Ltd. clause no longer contained the
arbitrator qualification provision, instead merely providing that any
dispute was to be resolved by a "single arbitrator."' 147 Accordingly, none
148
of the 2007 clauses contains a qualification provision
that raises any
149
decisionmaker.
the
of
question about the neutrality
The number of arbitrators (either one or three) obviously affects the
cost of the process. The parties can hold down the cost of arbitration by
specifying a sole arbitrator in the arbitration clause. 50 Conversely,
having a dispute resolved by a sole arbitrator may increase the risk of an
aberrational award, so if the parties are willing to pay the extra cost of
three arbitrators, they may be able to reduce that risk.' 51 Thus, in
145. Indeed, some courts have held that without a neutral decisionmaker, the process is not
even arbitration, and the clause cannot be enforced under the governing arbitration statute. E.g.,
Cheng-Canindin v. Renaissance Hotel Assocs., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 867, 873 (Ct. App. 1996).
146. Schlotzsky's, Inc., Franchise Agreement 17.4(b)(iii), at 48 (1999) (on file with the
Hofstra Law Review).
147. Schlotzsky's, Ltd., Franchise Agreement 2 1(B), at 31 (2007) (on file with the Hofstra
Law Review). Schlotzsky's corporate name change reflects a series of acquisitions following its
2004 Chapter II filing. See Mary Alice Kaspar, Schlotzsky's Next Move, AUSTIN Bus. J., Sept. 23,
2005, availableat http://austin.bizjourals.com/austin/stories/2005/09/26/story2.html.
148. Indeed, only three of the clauses in 2007 specify any qualification for the arbitrator or
arbitrators, in all three cases requiring that the arbitrator be experienced in franchise law.
149. Of course, some have asserted that AAA's role in arbitrator selection results in bias
because of the AAA's economic interest in having businesses continue to list it in their arbitration
clauses. See Letter from Gerald A. Marks to Secretary, Fed. Trade Comm'n, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/franrulestaffrpt/OL-l00020.pdf
(commenting on the FTC
Franchise Rule Staff Report and asserting that a "panel of neutrals [to resolve franchise disputes] are
created and pre-selected by the AAA which has receive[d] significant money and assignments from
[franchisors]").
150. Dunham & Lockerby, supra note 10, at II.
151. Buttrick et al., supra note 8, at 21; Dunham & Lockerby, supra note 10, at 12. That is,
unless deliberations move the panel of three arbitrators toward an extreme position. See David
Schkade et al., Deliberating About Dollars: The Severity Shift, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1139, 1153
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choosing the number of arbitrators, the drafting party faces a possible
tradeoff between the cost and riskiness of arbitration.

Table 8. Number of Arbitrators

One Arbitrator
Three Arbitrators
No Number Specified

1999
6
21.4%)
8
(28.6%)
14

2007
13
(46.4%)
4
(14.3%)
11

(50.0%)

(39.3%)

As Table 8 indicates, franchisors increasingly have resolved this
tradeoff in favor of holding down costs. Since 1999, the percentage of
arbitration clauses specifying a sole arbitrator has more than doubled,
with almost half (46.4%) of the clauses in 2007 so requiring152
Meanwhile, the percentage of clauses requiring three arbitrators has
declined from 28.6% (eight of twenty-eight) in 1999 to 14.3% (four of
twenty-eight) in 2007.153 The results suggest that franchisors are more
concerned4 about arbitration costs than about the risk of aberrational
awards.

15

Discovery. Discovery can be a major source of the cost of litigation.
By comparison, limited discovery traditionally has been "one of the
hallmarks of American commercial arbitration.'' 55 But one of the
complaints about arbitration is that discovery is increasing, along with
the associated costs. One way a drafting party might respond to
increased discovery costs in arbitration is by including a limitation on
discovery in its franchise agreement. Conversely, limited discovery may
reduce the accuracy of the dispute resolution process, possibly resulting
in more erroneous awards.

(2000) (finding that mock jury panels are more likely than individual mock jurors to give higher

monetary judgments in civil cases).
152. Seesupratbl.8.
153. Seesupratbl.8.
154. A possible alternative interpretation of these data is that franchisor fears of aberrational
awards have proved unwarranted so that they now are willing to provide for one arbitrator instead of
three to resolve any dispute. On this view, there might not be a tradeoff between cost and the risk of
an aberrational award.
155. IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW § 34.1 (Supp. 1999).
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Only a few franchise arbitration clauses include provisions
addressing discovery, and those provisions did not change significantly
between 1999 and 2007. Four of the twenty-eight clauses (14.3%) both
years imposed some limitation on discovery, although the limitations
differed in detail. 156 Interestingly, in both years, two clauses (7.1%)
provided for discovery in arbitration to the extent permitted by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a significant expansion of discovery
beyond that usual in arbitration. 157 Overall, then, the clauses reveal no
change, either in response to court unconscionability decisions or
concerns about the cost or accuracy of arbitration.
Table 9. Discovery Provisions

Limiting Discovery
Providing for Discovery to
the Extent Permitted by the
Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure
No Provision

1999

2007

4

4

(14.3%)

(14.3%)

2
(7.1%)

2
(7.1%)

22
(78.6%)

22
(78.6%)

Judicial Review of Awards. One commonly cited advantage of
arbitration is that it avoids delays that result from potentially lengthy
appeals.1 58 Conversely, the lack of court review is also cited as a
disadvantage of arbitration, because there is little a party can do if it the
arbitrator makes an aberrational award. 59 Limited court review thus is
another characteristic of arbitration that highlights the possible tradeoff
between cost savings and control of arbitral decisions. To the extent
parties have become more sensitive either to cost or to the risk of
aberrational decisions, one might see such perceptions reflected in
changes in provisions dealing with court review of arbitral awards.
However, as Table 10 shows, the number of clauses that included
provisions dealing with judicial review is unchanged between 1999 and
2007-only three of twenty-eight clauses (10.7%) contained such a
156.
157.
158.
159.

See infra tbl.9.
See infra tbl.9.
Lipsky & Seeber, supra note 37, at 17.
Id. at 26.
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provision in either year. 160 In both years, two clauses provided for de
novo review of arbitral awards exceeding specified dollar amounts., 61 In
1999, one clause required arbitrators to follow the law, a provision that
162
has the effect of permitting de novo review of arbitral legal rulings.
By comparison, in 2007, no clause required the arbitrators to follow the
law, but one clause purported to limit court review to the grounds
specified in section 10 of the FAA. 163 Presumably, the clause seeks to
for manifest disregard of the law
preclude courts from reviewing awards
64
grounds.1
nonstatutory
and other

160.

See infra tbi.10.

161. Seeinfratbl.10.
162. See infra tbl. 10; see also Christopher R. Drahozal, Contracting Around RUAA: Default
Rules, Mandatory Rules, and Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, 3 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 419,
431-33 (2003).
163. See infra tbl.10.
164. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953) (dictum) ("In unrestricted
submissions.., the interpretations of law by the arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregardare not
subject, in the federal courts, to judicial review for error in interpretation." (emphasis added)). But
see Birmingham News Co. v. Horn, 901 So. 2d 27, 48-49 (Ala. 2004) (finding that every federal
circuit recognizes "manifest disregard of the law" as a basis for vacating arbitration awards). In Hall
Street Associates v. Mattel, Inc., the Supreme Court cast doubt on the availability of non-statutory
grounds like manifest disregard by stating that section 10 of the FAA sets out the exclusive grounds
for vacating awards. 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1405-06 (2008); see also Ramos-Santiago v. United Parcel
Serv., 524 F.3d 120, 124 n.3 (1st Cir. 2008) (dicta) (describing Hall Street as deciding "that
manifest disregard of the law is not a valid ground for vacating or modifying an arbitral award in
cases brought under the Federal Arbitration Act"); Robert Lewis Rosen Assocs. v. Webb, 566 F.
Supp. 2d 228, 233 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) ("[I]n Hall Street, the Court finds that the manifest disregard of
the law standard is no longer good law."); Prime Therapeutics L.L.C. v. Omnicare, Inc., 555 F.
Supp. 2d 993, 999 (D. Minn. 2008) (stating that after Hall Street, courts "need not address ...extrastatutory grounds for vacating the arbitration award-that the arbitrator ignored the plain and
unambiguous language of the agreement and that the arbitrator's decision was in manifest disregard
of the law").
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Table 10. Judicial Review Provisions

Limiting Arbitrator
Authority to Make
Errors of Law
De Novo Review
Excluding Review on
Nonstatutory Grounds
None

1999
1
(3.6%)

2007
0
(0.0%)

2
(7.1%)
0
(0.0%)
25
(89.3%)

2
(7.1%)
1
(3.6%)
25
(89.3%)

Class Arbitration. One important change in the arbitration process
since 1999 has been the growth of class arbitration. Although class
arbitration has been around at least since the 1980s, 165 its use increased
dramatically after the Supreme Court's decision in Green Tree Financial
Corp. v. Bazzle, 166 as shown by the growth in the AAA's class arbitration
docket since that time. 167
If one of the reasons parties use arbitration clauses is to avoid
aggregate relief, one would expect them to respond to the growth of
class arbitration by inserting class arbitration waivers in their arbitration
clauses. Indeed, Justice Stevens so predicted during oral argument in
Bazzle.1 68 At the same time, parties that add a class arbitration waiver
face the risk that a court will hold the provision unconscionable, as an
increasing number of courts have done.' 69 If so, and if the court finds the
165. Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192, 1209-10 (Cal. 1982), rev'd on other grounds
sub noma,Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984). See generally Jean R. Sternlight, As
Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 1 (2000) (discussing early class arbitration proceedings).
166. 539 U.S. 444 (2003).
167. Drahozal, supra note 31, at 836-37. Following Bazzle, the AAA issued its Supplementary
Rules for Class Arbitrations. SUPPLEMENTARY RULES FOR CLASS ARBITRATION (effective Oct. 8,

2003), availableat http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=21936. JAMS, another arbitration provider, issued
its Class Action Procedures in February 2005. JAMS CLASS ACTION PROCEDURES (2005),
available at http://www.jamsadr.com/rules/class-action.asp.
168. Transcript of Oral Argument at 55, Green Tree Fin. Corp., 539 U.S. 444 (No. 02-634),
availableat www.supremecourtus.gov/oralarguments/argument.transcripts/02-634.pdf ("Does this
case have any real future significance, because isn't it fairly clear that all the arbitration agreements
in the future will prohibit class actions?").
169. See supratext accompanying note 69.
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class arbitration waiver severable, the case will proceed to class
arbitration anyway. If the court finds the class arbitration waiver not to
the case presumably will proceed as a putative class action
be severable,
70
in court.
As shown in Table 11, Justice Stevens's prediction largely has been
borne out in the franchise setting: The number of franchisors that
included class arbitration waivers in their arbitration clauses increased
significantly from 1999 to 2007, from fifteen of twenty-eight (or 53.6%)
to twenty-two of twenty-eight (or 78.6%).171 Most of the class arbitration
waivers simply contain language waiving class relief in arbitration. A
handful of clauses achieve the same result either by requiring arbitration
to proceed on an individual basis only (two of twenty-eight, or 7.1%, in
1999, and one of twenty-eight, or 3.6%, in 2007) or by precluding
joinder or consolidation (two of twenty-eight, or 7.1%, in both 1999 and
2007). 172

170. See Christopher R. Drahozal & Quentin R. Wittrock, Franchising,Arbitration, and the
Future of the Class Action, 3 ENTREPRENEURIAL Bus. L.J. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 17-

20, on file with the Hofstra Law Review).
171.
172.

Seeinfratbl.11.
Seeinftatbl.11.
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Table 11. Class Arbitration and Class Action Provisions

Class Arbitration Waiver
Waives Class Arbitration
Waives Class Arbitration; Nonseverability Provision
Waives Class Arbitration; Option
Regarding Provider
No Joinder or Consolidation
Individual Proceedings Only
Permits Class Arbitration for Specified
Type of Claim; Otherwise Waives Class
Arbitration
Permits Consolidation and Class Actions
in Court, but Waives Class Arbitration
None

1999
15
(53.6%)
11
(39.3%)
0 (0%)

2007
22
(78.6%)
15
(53.6%)
3 (10.7%)

0 (0%)

1 (3.6%)

2 (7.1%)
2 (7.1%)
2
(7.1%)

2 (7.1%)
1 (3.6%)
2
(7.1%)

1
(3.6%)
10
(35.7%)

1
(3.6%)
3
(10.7%)

Several of the class arbitration waivers in 2007 franchise
agreements were more elaborate. One (of twenty-eight, or 3.6%)
provided that if the arbitration provider refused to enforce the class
arbitration waiver, a different provider would be used. 173 Three others
(three of twenty-eight, or 10.7%) addressed the severability issue
directly, and provided that in the event the class arbitration waiver is
held unenforceable, the entire arbitration clause is invalid.1 74 Without
such a clause, as noted above, a court might sever an invalid class
arbitration waiver and order the case to proceed to arbitration on a class
basis. With such a clause, the case likely will proceed in court as a
putative class action. None of the 1999 arbitration clauses included such
a provision.
Non-severability provisions could be characterized as a form of
flight from arbitration, albeit only in the limited number of cases in
which the provisions are implicated. By including a non-severability
173.
174.

Seesupratbl.11.
Seesupratbl.11.
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provision in their arbitration clause, parties are indicating that they
prefer class actions in court over class arbitrations. On the other hand,
attempts to avoid class arbitration arguably are not a flight from
arbitration, at least as it was traditionally conducted, but rather a flight
from a new form of dispute resolution that largely did not exist until
recent years.
Interestingly, two of the clauses (two of twenty-eight, or 7.1%, both
in 1999 and 2007) permitted class arbitration, but only of claims by
franchisees against the franchisor for misappropriation of funds.1 75 One
other clause waived class arbitration but permitted both (1) consolidation
and (2) claims subject to a class action in
of related cases in arbitration
176
court.
in
proceed
to
court
Location ofArbitration Proceeding.Arbitration clauses in franchise
agreements commonly address the location of the arbitration proceeding.
Some courts have held location provisions unconscionable when they
office of the franchisor) that is
specify a location (such as the home 177
inconvenient for the non-drafting party.
As Table 12 illustrates, there has been no change in the percentage
of franchise agreements providing for arbitration to take place at the
franchisor's home. In both 1999 and 2007, 82.1% (twenty-three of
twenty-eight) of the franchise arbitration clauses specified the
franchisor's home as the place of arbitration. 78 In both years, only one
clause specified the franchisee's home, one specified the respondent's
a neutral location, and one gave the choice to the
home, one 17specified
9
franchisor.

175.

See supra tbl. 11.

176. In Table l1, we did not classify this clause as including a class arbitration waiver because
it effectively excludes class actions from arbitration altogether.
177. See cases cited supranote 70.
178. See infratbl.12.
179. See infra tbl.12.
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Table 12. Location of Arbitration Proceeding

Franchisor's Home
Option for Franchisor
Franchisee's Home
Neutral Location
Respondent's Home
No Location

1999
23
(82.1%
1
(3.6%)
1
(3.6%
1
(3.6%)
1
(3.6%
1
(3.6%)

2007
23
82.1%
1
(3.6%)
1
(3.6%)
1
(3.6%)
1
(3.6%)
1
(3.6%)

Arbitration Costs. Arbitration differs from litigation in that upfront
costs can be higher: Parties in arbitration typically must put down a
deposit to cover arbitrator fees and any administrative costs. By
comparison, the only cost to file suit in court is a (relatively) small filing
fee. 180 These upfront costs of arbitration have provided a common basis
for parties to challenge the enforceability of arbitration clauses-by
asserting that arbitration costs prevented the claimant from vindicating
his or her statutory rights or rendered the arbitration clause
unconscionable. 181 In addition, the parties themselves may allocate
arbitration costs (including attorneys' fees) in their arbitration
agreements or otherwise in their contracts. Depending on how they are
drafted, these provisions may reduce the risk of court challenge (such as
by providing that the drafting party agrees to bear the costs of
arbitration, for example) or may themselves be subject to challenge as
unconscionable. 182
As Table 13 shows, franchise agreements include a variety of
provisions dealing with the allocation of costs, which have changed little

180. Drahozal, supra note 71, at 736-42.
181. Id. at 742-56; see also Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000)
(dictum) ("It may well be that the existence of large arbitration costs could preclude a
litigant.., from effectively vindicating her federal statutory rights in the arbitral forum.").
182. See supra text accompanying notes 71.
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between 1999 and 2007.183 The number of clauses adopting the Britishrule-that the prevailing party can recover its attorneys' fees-is
unchanged from 1999 to 2007,184 although the number of clauses
providing the franchisor (but not the franchisee) that remedy increased,
albeit only slightly. Only one clause provided for the franchisor to assist
the franchisee with arbitration
costs, and one other clause reserved to the
18 5
franchisor the right to do So.

Table 13. Allocation of Costs

Bear Own Costs with Exceptions
Prevailing Party
Franchisor as Prevailing Party
Share Arbitrators' Fees
Cost Assistance by Franchisor
No Provision

1999

2007

6

6

(21.4%)

(21.4%)

11
(39.3%)
3

11
(39.3%)
5

(10.7%)

(17.9%)

1
(3.6%)
0
(0.0%)
7

1
(3.6%)
1
(3.6%)
4

(25.0%)

(14.3%)

Time Limits on Claims. Provisions setting a time limit for bringing
a claim (typically shorter than the statute of limitations) also have been
held unconscionable by some courts. 186 More franchisors included such
provisions in their arbitration clauses in 2007 than in 1999.187 In 1999,
42.9% of the clauses included some time limit for bringing claims; by
2007, 60.7% of the clauses included such a provision. 188 Accordingly,
183. See infra tbl. 13. Cost allocation provisions appear in many different parts of the franchise
agreement, not just in the arbitration clause. Thus, the numbers shown in Table 13 may understate
the frequency of such provisions.
184. See infra tbl.13.
185. See infra tbl.13.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 66, 72.
187. See infra tbl.14.

188. Several of the clauses specify alternative time limits-one year to two years (two in
2007); six months to one year (one in 1999; one in 2007); one year to eighteen months (one in
2007)-typically one that begins to run when the dispute arises and the other when the claimant has
knowledge of the claim.
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the changes in time limit provisions provide no evidence that franchisors
are responding to court unconscionability decisions by modifying their
arbitration clauses.

Table 14. Time Limits for Filing Claims

Six Months to One Year
With Exceptions
Eighteen Months to Two Years
With Exceptions
Three Years
No Provision

1999
6

2007
9

(21.4%)

(32.1%)

2
(7.1%)
1
(3.6%)
2

4
(14.3%)
2
(7.1%)
2

(7.1%)

(7.1%)

1
(3.6%)
16
(57.1%)

2
(7.1%)
9
(32.1%)

Punitive Damages Limitations. An important reason some drafting
parties include arbitration clauses is to reduce the risk of punitive
damages awards. 189 But a number of courts have held punitive damages
waivers unconscionable, in some cases invalidating the entire arbitration
clause as well. 190
Although the percentage of franchise arbitration clauses with
waivers of all recovery of punitive damages declined somewhat (from
53.6% to 46.4%) from 1999 to 2007,191 the percentage of clauses with
some waiver of punitive damages increased (from 64.3% to 75.0%). 192
The reason, as Table 15 shows, is a sizable increase in the number of
clauses waiving some but not all recovery of punitive damages. In most
cases, the exceptions appear one-sided, permitting the recovery of
punitive damages for claims that typically would be asserted by the
franchisor against the franchisee, but not vice versa.

189.
190.
191.
192.

Drahozal & Hylton, supra note 6, at 574.
See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
See infra tbl.15.
See infra tbl. 15.
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Table 15. Restrictions on Punitive Damages

Waives Punitive Damages
Waives Punitive Damages with
Exceptions
Franchisee Waives Punitive Damages
Waiver of Punitive Damages with
Severability Provision
Arbitrator Lacks Authority to Award
Punitive Damages
No Provision

1999
15
(53.6%)
3
(10.7%)
1
(3.6%)
0
(0%)
2
(7.1%)
7
(25.0%)

2007
13
(46.4%)
8
(28.6%)
0
(0%)
1
(3.6%)
2
(7.1%
4
(14.3%)

Carve-Outs (that is, Exceptions to Arbitration). Virtually every
arbitration clause in the sample excluded (carved out) some disputes or
claims from arbitration.1 93 Such carve-outs have been controversial. On
the one hand, carve-outs make sense given that the benefits and costs of
arbitration vary depending on the type of dispute or remedy.' 94 On the
other hand, several courts have held arbitration clauses unenforceable
(on either unconscionability or other grounds) because of carve-outs that
allegedly permitted
the drafting party but not the non-drafting party to
95
go to court.'
Table 16 lists the most common carve-outs from franchise
arbitration clauses in the sample. The percentage of clauses containing
each type of carve-out has either stayed the same or increased slightly
from 1999 to 2007.196 For example, the most common carve-out is for
trademark disputes, which appeared in 67.9% of the franchise arbitration

193. Some franchisors lease or sublease the franchised premises to franchisees, using leases
that do not contain arbitration clauses. Such agreements may effectively exclude claims for
repossession of real property from arbitration without including language to that effect in the
arbitration clause. As a result, Table 16 may understate the number of exceptions in arbitration
clauses in the sample. Of course, sometimes franchisors expressly exclude disputes arising out of
subleases from the arbitration clause in the franchise agreement.
194. See supra Part II.
195. See, e.g., E-Z Cash Advance, Inc. v. Harris, 60 S.W.3d 436, 442 (Ark. 2001); Armendariz
v. Found. Health Psychare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 694 (Cal. 2000).
196. See infra tbl.16.
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clauses in 1999 and 71.4% of the clauses in 2007.197 Carve-outs of
claims for provisional remedies and injunctive relief (which also are
relevant for trademark disputes, although not limited to such1 98disputes)
also were more frequent, although, again, not dramatically so.

Table 16. Common Exceptions to Arbitration ("Carve-Outs")

Trademark Disputes
Provisional Remedies
Injunctive Relief
Money Due
Covenants Not to Compete
Immediate Termination of Franchise
Confidential Information
Repossession of Property

1999
19
67.9%)
12
(42.9%)
11
(39.3%)
8
(28.6%)
7
(25.0%)
7
(25.0%)
3
(10.7%)
4
(14.3%)

2007
20
(71.4%)
14
(50.0%)
14
(50.0%)
10
(35.7%)
8
(28.6%)
7
(25.0%)
6
(21.4%)
4
(14.3%)

The slight increase in the frequency of carve-outs reflects some
degree of flight from arbitration (although a relatively minor one). The
risk of court invalidation for lack of mutuality or unconscionability
seems not to have discouraged franchisors from excluding certain
disputes or remedies from their arbitration clauses.
V.

CONCLUSION

Subject to the limitations of our dataset, we find little evidence that
franchisors in the aggregate are fleeing arbitration. The percentage of
franchisors that include arbitration clauses in their franchise agreements
is virtually the same in 2007 as it was in 1999, although some

197. See infra tbl.16.
198. See infra tbl.16.
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franchisors have stopped using arbitration clauses while others have
started. Likewise, there is no indication that franchisees are fleeing
arbitration by avoiding franchisors that use arbitration clauses. We do
find a slight increase in the use of carve-outs, which is a limited form of
flight. Moreover, the increased use of non-severability provisions (none
in 1999; three of twenty-eight, or 10.7% in 2007),99 which result in the
invalidation of the arbitration clause in the event the class arbitration
waiver in the clause is held invalid, might also be a form of flight, albeit
again in only a limited number of cases.
As for other terms in arbitration clauses, the most significant
change has been the substantial increase in class arbitration waivers
(from 50% to over 80% of clauses).2 °° Other common changes, such as
providing for a sole arbitrator instead of a panel of three arbitrators,
appear designed to reduce arbitration costs. Indeed, when facing a choice
between holding down costs and reducing the risk of aberrational
awards, parties that modified clauses typically made changes that would
hold down costs.
Finally, we find almost no modifications to arbitration clauses in
response to the risk of court invalidation (the non-severability provisions
being the most notable exception). Franchisors have not reduced their
use of any of the provisions that some courts have held unconscionable.
It may be that parties have not had sufficient time to respond to cases
like Nagrampa (the en banc opinion was not issued until December 4,
2006, while the data was collected in mid-2007).2 °1 Or it may be that
some combination of switching costs, 20 2 a bias in favor of the status
quo, 203 or simply inertia are the explanation. But so far, at any rate, court
decisions have had almost no effect on the terms of franchise arbitration
clauses.

199. See supra tbl.11.
200. See supra text accompanying note 21.
201. Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
202. Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate
Contracting (or "The Economics ofBoilerplate'), 83 VA. L. REv. 713, 727-29 (1997) ("Switching
costs may create pressure for a firm to avoid adopting terms in a new contract that deviate from
those in its existing contracts."); W. Mark C. Weidemaier, DisputingBoilerplate, 82 TEMP. L. REV.
(forthcoming Spring, 2008) (manuscript at 9-11, on file with authors).
203. Cf. Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L.
REV. 608, 612 (1998) ("[C]ontracting parties view default terms as part of the status quo, and they
prefer the status quo to alternative states, all other things equal.").
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